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THE REPUDIATION OF PLATO: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or
creche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but
the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who
are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret, so that no
one will know what has become of them.
Plato, The Republic'
Plato's solution for the handicapped children of Athens advanced
some 2400 years ago was rejected by the Supreme Court of the
United States in famous dictum in Meyer v. Nebraska2 as being
"ideas. . . wholly different'from those upon which our institutions
rest .... "3 However, it took about half a century for the ultimate
repudiation of the ideas espoused by the great philosopher as the
Supreme Court's 1923 dictum finally bore fruit in federal court deci-
sions establishing a constitutional right to education for handi-
capped children4 and in a congressional definition of such a right in
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.5 These
actions of the last decade have not only put to rest the ancient view
that handicapped persons are of no worth and should be set apart
or destroyed but they have also wrought at least a small revolution
in the delivery of educational and other services to such persons.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Youth Advocacy Clinic, T.C. Williams
School of Law, University of Richmond; LL.B., Washington and Lee University, 1961. The
author expresses his appreciation to Carolyn White Shenton, Director, Donald H. Stone, Staff
Attorney, and Alonzo T. Dill, I-I and Catherine D. Robertson, all of the Virginia Developmen-
tal Disabilities Protection and Advocacy Office, Richmond, Virginia, who provided invalua-
ble assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 1 PLATo, THE RaEuBac 463 (P. Shorey trans. 1930).
2. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
3. Id. at 402.
4. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
5. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)).
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The central purpose of this article is not to explore the constitu-
tional doctrines or theories implicit in the existence of a right to
education for handicapped children,' nor is it to examine the poli-
cies advanced by the federal and state legislation and regulations,
for both of these functions have been served well in other forums.8
The intent here is to provide the general practitioner of the law, or
the legal specialist in areas other than education, or the sophisti-
cated lay advocate with a practice manual to guide them through
the processes afforded to adjudicate the educational rights of handi-
capped children.' The particular bias of the article is in favor of a
6. See, e.g., Alschuler, Education for the Handicapped, 7 J. LAW & EDUC. 523 (1978);
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualification of Handicapped
Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SurA CLARA L. REV.
855 (1975); Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24
HASTING L.J. 1087 (1973); McCarthy, Is the Equal Protection Clause Stil! a Viable Tool for
Effecting Educational Reform, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 159 (1977); McClung, "Do Handicapped
Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?", 3 J. LAW & EDUC. 153
(1974); Zettel & Abeson, The Right to a Free Appropriate Education, THE CoumRs AND
EDUCATION 188 (C. Hooker ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Zettel & Abeson]; Project,
Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1976);
Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 CIN. L. REv. 796 (1975); Note,
The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 ComRzu.
L. REV. 519 (1974); Comment, The Handicapped Child Has a Right .o an Appropriate
Education, 55 NEB. L. REv. 637 (1976); Comment, Toward a Legal Thecry of the Right to
Education of the Mentally Retarded, 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 554 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Baugh, The Federal Legislation on Equal Educational Opportunity for the
Handicapped, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 65 (1978); Moore & Bulman, Recent Changes in the Law
Affecting Educational Hearing Procedures for Handicapped Children, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 41
(1977); Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REv. 71
(1978); Weinstein, Education of Exceptional Children, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 987 (1979);
Contemporary Studies Project, Special Education: The Struggle for Equal Educational Op-
portunity in Iowa, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1283 (1977); Note, Children Requiring Special Education:
New Federal Requirements, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE L. REv. 462 (1977); Note, Enforcing the Right
to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Enforcing the Right]; Note, The Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act: Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 43 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Opening the Schoolhouse Door]; Note, A Proce-
dural Guideline for Implementing the Right to Free Public Education for Handicapped
Children, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 136 (1974); Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 110 (1976) [hereinafter cited J. L. REF.I; Comment, Public
Instruction to the Learning Disabled: Higher Hurdles for the Handicapped, 8 U.S.F. L. REv.
113 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of
an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 961 (1977); Levinson, The Right to a Minimally
Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U. L. REV. 253 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right
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broad view of the child's rights and its usefulness will therefore be
most pronounced for the person contacted by a handicapped child,
or his or her parents, to assist the child in obtaining an appropriate
educational program. This article will focus narrowly on the educa-
tional rights of handicapped persons and will not touch, except
peripherally, upon such issues as architectural barriers, employ-
ment rights, or other matters also of concern at the present time.'0
The initial portion of the article will survey in a very summary
manner the court decisions and other forces that led to the passage
of the 1975 Act and will describe the basic substantive requirements
of the Act. Part II of the article will narrow the focus to examine
the procedural framework established by the Act, the equally im-
portant Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,11 the regula-
tions implementing each Act, and the state statutes and regulations
conforming to the federal mandates as exemplified by Virginia's
response to the newly defined rights of the handicapped. Finally,
Part III delineates procedural options, strategies and tactics in han-
dling a case under the Acts from initial client contact to the filing
of litigation after full utilization of administrative remedies. The
focus will be practical rather than theoretical and the article is
supplemented by Appendices describing resources to aid the newly
informed advocate in advancing the cause of the handicapped child.
to an Effective Minimal Edcuation, 36 Omo ST. L. J. 349 (1975); Krass, The Right to Public
Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 4 U. ILL. L. FORUM
1016 (1976).
10. These are undoubtedly important and significant issues that are being addressed in-
creasingly in litigation around the country. However, the length and purpose of this article
does not allow for a discussion of these problems. See generally, PUBLIc INTEREST LAW CENTER
OF PHILADEPHIA, 504 HANoBoOK (2d ed. 1979); Charmatz & Penn, Postsecondary and Voca-
tional Education Programs and the Vocational Education Programs and the "Otherwise
Qualified" Provision of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF.
67 (1978); Dubow, Litigating for the Rights of Handicapped People, 84 CASE & COMMENT 3
(Mar.-Apr. 1979); Wolff, Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies Under
Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis L. J. 25 (1978); Note,
Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61
GEO. L. J. 1501 (1973).
11. 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
1979] 785
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I. THE JUDICIAL ARTICULATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
HANDICAPPED AND THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975.
The seminal decision in leading to a definition of a right to educa-
tion for handicapped persons is the historic 1954 Supreme Court
pronouncement of Brown v. Board of Education.'2 The Court's at-
tention there obviously was focused on the legality of racially segre-
gated schools, but the opinion by. Chief Justice Earl 'Warren offered
an equal protection analysis that has proven to be of significant
utility to those advocating the educational rights of handicapped
children.' 3 When the Court decided that a state must make public
education available to all children on an equal basis, without regard
to questions of race, they fashioned a tool of broader value. The tool
thus defined was slow to be applied to handicapped children but
once application was made the impact was almost immediate.'4 Two
contemporaneous lawsuits in different jurisdictions challenged the
exclusion of handicapped children from public education programs
and the results of the litigation were similar. In Pennsylvania Asso-
ciation for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 5 and Mills
v. Board of Education,"5 the courts reached comparable conclusions
in somewhat different contexts. PARC was a class action suit
brought to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes which had the
effect of excluding mentally retarded children from the public
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. The Court in Brown stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizE-nship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms. Id. at 493.
14. See, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 6. See also Recent
Cases, Education: The Right of Retarded Children to Receive an Education Suited to Their
Needs, 77 DICK. L. REv. 577 (1973).
15. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), noted
in 18 VnL. L. REv. 277 (1972).
16. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
786 [Vol. 13:783
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schools without due process. Although the case was terminated by
the entry of a consent decree which did not address all the issues
raised, the court noted nonetheless that Pennsylvania had denied
procedural due process to handicapped children by not establishing
a hearing procedure preceding either placement in a particular pub-
lic education program or exclusion from such a program." The dis-
trict judge acknowledged that placement decisions were critical in
this area of education because of the stigmatization that could occur
from improper labelling. 8 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision
in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 11 the court agreed that due process
demanded a fair process before stigmatizing a citizen and a colora-
ble due process claim was thus presented."0 The PARC court's anal-
ysis of the equal protection claims was more superficial because of
the voluntary consent decree, but the court, relying upon Brown,
concluded that there were "serious doubts . . . as to the existence
of a rational basis"'" for the state to provide public education pro-
grams for some children while denying public education to others
because of handicaps.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia was
confronted with similar arguments in Mills when a class action suit
was brought there on behalf of all out-of-school handicapped chil-
dren in the District.22 In December of 1971, a stipulated agreement
and order was entered by the court, but scarcely a month later the
plaintiffs sought summary judgment in light of the defendants' fail-
ure to comply with the earlier determination. 23 In August of 1972,
the district judge granted the relief sought by the plaintiffs and
declared that all children, regardless of any handicapping condition,
had a right to a publicly supported education and that the defen-
dants in the case through their rules, practices and policies had
excluded such children without any provision for adequate and
timely alternative procedures, thus denying the plaintiff class due
17. 343 F. Supp. at 298.
18. Id. at 293-95.
19. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
20. 343 F. Supp. at 295.
21. Id. at 297.
22. 348 F. Supp. at 868-70.
23. Id. at 871-73.
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process and equal protection of the law. 24 The defendants' protesta-
tions of lack of resources to carry out the relief originally mandated
were swept aside by the court on the basis that such lack could not
fall disproportionately on the handicapped child. 21 The Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 2 that education is not a constitutionally guar-
anteed fundamental right did not dilute the major impact of PARC
and Mills on the subsequent development of the law.17
As useful as such generalized attacks as those contained in PARC
and Mills might be in focusing attention on the needs of handi-
capped children generally and as effective as they might be in deal-
ing with issues such as total exclusion, constitutional litigation
could not hope to define the parameters of programs designed for
specific children with handicapping conditions. This inability to
effectively target class action litigation, coupled with the uncertain-
ties wrought by Rodriguez, dictated a shift to legislation as the
principal tool for fashioning long-term relief for handicapped chil-
dren. Even by 1972 over two-thirds of the states had adopted some
form of mandatory legislation regarding the education of handi-
capped children. 21 Three years later only two states had failed to
adopt mandatory legislation and thirty-seven of t~he forty-eight
states with such legislation had enacted their new special education
laws during the decade of the 1970's.21 Congress extended this move-
24. Id. at 875. The court's constitutional holdings are arguably dicta as the court had
already concluded that the school district's actions were violative of District of Columbia
statutes and the district's own regulations. Id. at 873-74.
25. The court said:
Similarly the District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children clearly
must outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources. If sufficient funds are
not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable
in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner
that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with
his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the District of Colum-
bia Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative
inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the "exceptional"
or handicapped child than on the normal child. Id. at 876.
26. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
27. Dimond & Reed, Rodriguez and Retarded Children, 2 J.L. & EDuc. 476 (1973). See also,
The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, supra note 6, at 653-57.
28. Zettel & Abeson supra note 6 at 198.
29. Id. at 198-99; S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-1, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1444-45.
[Vol. 13:783
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ment to the federal level and painted on a much larger canvas by
passing the Education Amendments of 1974 ordering, in Title VI-
B, state education agencies to develop and submit to the United
States Commissioner of Education detailed, long-range plans for
the achievement of full educational programs for all handicapped
children within each of the respective states." The same Congress
broadened the mandate, however, by the passage of Public Law 94-
142-the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.3' The
legislative history of this Act reveals the debt owed by Congress to
PARC and Mills and to the growing coverage of state laws when the
legislators acknowledged that "court action and State laws through-
out the Nation have made clear that the right to education of handi-
capped children is a present right, one which is to be implemented
immediately."32 The Congress stated the legislative intent of the
new Act in broad and expansive language:
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children
have available to them, within the time periods specified. . ., a free
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure
that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardi-
ans are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the
education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the
effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.-
But it was not simply this lofty purpose that made the 1975 federal
legislation so significant; the substantive requirements set forth
wrought a revolution in American public education.
The Act incorporated the broadest possible definition of proce-
dural rights for handicapped children contained in the antecedent
litigation and it provided for the allocation of large sums of federal
monies to the states to soften the burden imposed by the higher
costs of special education.N The legislation essentially mandates
30. Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title VI-B, 88 Stat. 579-85 (1974).
31. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)).
32. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEwS 1425, 1441.
33. 89 Stat. 775 (1975).
34. See Stafford, supra note 6, at 75-76; Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1105; J.L. REP.
supra note 7 at 116-17. The Senate committee considering the legislation estimated that a
197,9]
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that all participating states must provide a "free appropriate public
education" to all handicapped children between three and eighteen
by September 1, 1978, with an expansion of the upper age limit to
twenty-one by September 1, 1980.15 A "handicapped child" is a
child who needs special education and related services because" of
hearing impairment or deafness, visual impairment or blindness,
mental retardation, speech impairment, emotional disturbance,
chronic or long-term health impairment, physical impairment, spe-
cific learning disability or multiple handicapping conditions. 3 The
law further defines a "free appropriate public education" to include"special education and related services" provided at public expense
without charge to the parent or child which meet the standards of
the state educational agency to include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in conformity with the
particular child's "individualized education program. '37 "Special
education" means, in the legislative lexicon, specially designed in-
struction to meet the specific needs of a handicapped child, includ-
ing classroom instruction, home instruction, physical education and
institutional and hospital instruction. The ancillary phrase,"related services," is defined to include transportation and those
developmental, corrective and other supportive services (including
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occu-
pational therapy, recreation, counseling and diagnostic and evalua-
tive medical services) required to assist a handicapped child to ben-
efit from special education and further include the early identifica-
handicapped child, on the average, is twice as expensive to educate as a nonhandicapped
child. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 15, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1439.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976). The implementing regulations define the age limits to
include "handicapped children aged three through twenty-one," thus creating a discrepancy
between the two. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.122(b) (1978) (emphasis added). The Act and regulations
provide exceptions with respect to handicapped persons aged three to five and eighteen to
twenty-one where State law or a court order is inconsistent with the provision for these age
groups. Virginia law provides for special education for "handicapped children between the
ages of two and twenty-one .... ." VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
36. Id. § 1401(1). This is a two step test applying the Act to a child who is 1) handicapped,
and 2) requires special education and related services. If the first test is met but not the
second, then the protection of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would be required. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
37. Id. § 1401(18).
38. Id. § 1401(16).
[Vol. 13:783
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tion and assessment of handicapping conditions." The final critical
definition, of the term "individualized education program," pro-
vides for a written statement to be developed for each handicapped
child in a meeting of a representative of a local education agency or
counterpart regional agency charged with the provision of special
education with the teacher, the child's parents or guardians and the
child, when appropriate, and which writing must include: 1) a state-
ment of the child's present level of educational performance; 2) a
statement of annual goals and short-term instructional objectives;
3) a description of specific educational services to be provided the
child along with a statement of the extent to which the child will
be able to participate in regular educational programs; 4) the pro-
jected initiation date and expected duration of educational services;
and 5) a delineation of appropriate objective criteria and evaluation
procedures and schedules for determining, at least annually,
whether the instructional objectives established are being
achieved." The definitions are critical to the enforcement of the Act
because they establish the boundaries of the rights delineated so
broadly by Congress.
The federal program established by the Act is to be administered
by the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in the United
States Office of Education which also has responsibility for teacher
training and research into the education of the handicapped.,' Fed-
eral funds may be utilized to acquire equipment and to construct
necessary facilities although the facilities must be used for the pur-
poses for which they were constructed for at least twenty years or
the federal government may recoup that portion of the cost paid out
of federal funds.'2 Each recipient of federal funds is charged to"make positive efforts to employ, and advance in employment,
qualified handicapped individuals" although this language appears
39. Id. § 1401(17). Related services would seem to be required only when special education
is being provided. See Bureau of Education for the Handicapped Policy Letter to James T.
Micklem, January 2, 1979, 2 Education for the Handicapped Law Report (CRR) 211:86 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as EHLR]. If related services are needed without special education, then
Section.504 of the Rehabilitation Act would have to provide the basis for these services. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
40. Id. § 1401(19).
41. Id. § 1402.
42. Id. § 1404.
1979]
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to be largely hortatory.13 The United States Commissioner of Educa-
tion is also authorized to "make grants to pay part or all of the costs
of altering existing facilities" so as to remove architectural barriers
to the free movement of handicapped persons but no funds have yet
been appropriated to fund this section of the law."
The funding formulas are contained in section 611 of the Act and
they provide for the allocation of federal funds to each state based
on the number of handicapped children between the ages of three
and twenty-one receiving special education and related services. 5
The principal funding formula is predicated on a percentage of the
average per pupil expenditure in public elementary and secondary
schools which establishes the total fund of money to be divided
among the states. Beginning in fiscal year 1978 the Act creates a
fund based on five per cent of the average per pupil expenditure
multiplied by the total number of handicapped children being
served. The funding formula rises significantly to ten per cent in
fiscal year 1979, to twenty per cent in fiscal year 1980, to thirty per
cent in fiscal year 1981, and to forty per cent for fiscal year 1982 and
for every year thereafter. Thus, if the average per pupil expenditure
in the initial year was $1,400, then five per cent of this amount
would be seventy dollars. If, during the prior school year, there were
five million handicapped children, the fiscal authorization would be
five million x $70 = $350,000,000. Assuming comparable figures for
ensuing years, by fiscal year 1982 the authorization would total
$2,800,000,000. The individual states will receive an allocation
based on the number of handicapped children being served and the
percentage this number represents as compared to the nation as a
whole. The state's total handicapped count cannot exceed twelve
per cent of its school age (5-17) population, the number who are
learning disabled cannot exceed one-sixth of that figure, or two per
cent of the school age population, and no child counted for purposes
of funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
43. Id. § 1405.
44. Id. § 1406.
45. Id. § 1411. At least one court decision views "the main purpose of the Act [to be] the
funding of special schools for the handicapped," a rather narrow view of the legislation.
Eberle v. Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 444 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D.Pa. 1977),
affl'd, 582 F. 2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D.
Conn. 1979).
[Vol. 13:783
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196546 can be included in the tabulations." If, after these exclusions,
a state has a tabulated total of 100,000 handicapped children which
would represent two per cent of the national figure, that state would
receive two per cent of the federal appropriation or $7,000,000 of the
hypothetical $350,000,000 described above for the first year of the
authorization. No state can receive less than the amount received
in fiscal year 1977, and Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands
and the Pacific Trust Territories are limited to one per cent of the
total appropriation. Further limitations are placed on the use of the
state share of the funds with a state being permitted to spend fifty
per cent of its federal grant at the state level on support services in
1978 with the other half passing directly to local education agencies
and that breakdown shifts to 75%-25% in favor of the local agencies
in fiscal 1979 and ensuing years. 8 The state may not spend more
than five per cent of the federal funds, or $200,000, whichever is
greater, for administrative costs." As with the states, local educa-
tion agencies are entitled to a share of the federal funds that repre-
sent proportionately the number of local handicapped children as
compared with the number statewide."
To establish eligibility for federal funds under the Act, the state
must demonstrate that it assures all handicapped children the right
to a free appropriate education and that it is proceeding on a timeta-
ble to a "goal of providing full educational opportunity" for the
children."1 The state must also establish priorities with the initial
preference being for handicapped children not receiving an ediica-
tion and the second priority going to the handicapped children
46. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 491 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 241 c-1). Now
repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2180 (1978) (see 20 U.S.C. § 2771 (1979)). The
learning disability ceiling has been controversial and has effectively been superceded by
regulations issued by the Commissioner of Education pursuant to § 5(b) of Pub. L. No. 94-
142, 89 Stat. 773, 794 (1975). See now 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.5, 121a.540-.543, 121a.702(a)(2)
(deleted) (1978).
47. The computations included are based largely on an analysis found in NATIONAL SCHOOL
PUBLIC RELATIONs ASSOCIATION, EDUCATING ALL THE HANDICAPPED: WHAT THE LAws SAY & WHAT
SCHOOLS ARE DOING 14-15 (1977).
48. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411(b)(1), (c)(1) (1976).
49. Id. §§ 1411(b)(2), (c)(2).
50. Id. § 1411(d). The Act cannot be utilized to allow a state to give financial aid to private
schools that engage in racially discriminatory practices. Bishop v. Starkville Academy, 442
F. Supp. 1176 (N.D.Miss. 1977).
51. Id. § 1412.
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within each category of "disability, with the most severe handicap
who are receiving an inadequate education. ' 52 The state is further
obligated to establish requirements for: 1) local education agencies
to draw up individualized education programs for each child; 2)
procedural safeguards for children and parents; 3) tests and evalua-
tions to be provided in the child's native language (as defined in the
Bilingual Education Act 53) or "mode of communication" which are
not either racially or culturally discriminatory; and 4) "to the maxi-
mum extent appropriate" have handicapped children educated in
the "least restrictive environment" that is consistent with the
child's needs.54
The Act further establishes very strict procedural safeguards for
handicapped children and their parents to include: 1) the right to
examine all relevant records pertaining to identification, evaluation
and educational placement; 2) the right to obtain an independent
educational evaluation of the child; 3) a right to written prior notice
in their native language of any proposed action which would initiate
or change the identification, evaluation or educational placement of
a child or the provision of a free appropriate education for the child;
and 4) the right to present complaints about any action affecting the
child.5 If the child is a state ward or his or her parents or guardians
are unknown or unavailable, special procedures including the ap-
pointment of a surrogate parent to protect the child's interests are
mandated.58 The provisions establishing procedures for impartial
due process hearings to provide a forum for the determination of
parental complaints regarding identification, evaluation, placement
and provision of services constitute the most significant substantive
reforms to special education around the country. Parents or guardi-
ans are thus given access to a hearing and appeal mechanism for the
review of a broad range of grievances pertaining to all aspects of the
handicapped child's educational experience. There is a right to an
impartial due process hearing afforded by the local educational
agency and to an impartial administrative review at the state level.
52. Id. § 1412(3).
53. Id. § 880b-l(a)(2).
54. Id. § 1412.
55. Id. § 1415.
56. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(B).
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At any administrative hearing the parties have "(1) the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with spe-
cial knowledge or training with respect to the problems of handi-
capped children, (2) the right to present evidence and confront,
cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, (3) the right
to a written or electronic verbatim record of such hearing, and- (4)
the right to written findings of facts and decisions . . . ,,57 The Act
also provides a legal remedy where administrative proceedings have
proved unavailing with parties afforded the right to bring a civil
action regarding a complaint under the law in a state court of com-
petent jurisdiction or in a federal district court without regard to the
amount in controversy. 8 Pending the outcome of any proceedings,
the child will remain in the current educational placement in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, although a child out of
school will be placed in school unless the parents or guardian ob-
ject.59 This sketchy highlighting of the major substantive provisions
of the Act will provide a backdrop before which the specific dramas
must be played out. The substantive framework of the legislation
delineates rights and responsibilities that outstrip by far the limits
of past litigation and provides a multicolored tapestry to serve as
background for the assertion of educational rights for specific chil-
dren.
II. THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AFFORDED BY SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975, REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THESE ACTS AND
VIRGINIA LAW AND REGULATIONS.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197360 has been described
as the first civil rights law for handicapped persons and its language
is simple, direct and forceful: "No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(6) of this
title, shall solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
57. Id. § 1415(d).
58. Id. § 1415(e).
59. Id. § 1415(e)(3).
60. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
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cial assistance."'" This provision tracks, in both intent and lan-
guage, the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 197263 as they apply to race and
sex discrimination. Although the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 affords broad protection for handicapped chil-
dren, it will only apply in those jurisdictions which elect to partici-
pate. 4 However, Section 504 applies to any state or school district
that receives federal funds at all, regardless of participation in the
more specific legislation. It provides relief in such areas as architec-
tural barriers 5 where the 1975 law is simply hortatory, and it places
certain constraints on local education agencies as employers as well
as in their educator roles.66 The simple one-sentence forcefulness of
Section 504 gave birth to more than twenty pages of regulations
which flesh out the law. Similarly, regulations issued pursuant to
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 give added
depth and dimension to the procedural requirements of the law. 8
Rather than simply providing a survey of the federal regulations and
implementing Virginia law and regulations, a focus upon the spe-
cific problem areas should prove most useful to the advocate.
A. School Records
A frequent issue will be presented by the two-edged sword of
accessibility to a handicapped child's school record13. The issue is
characterized as such because parents may desire access to the re-
cords themselves while at the same time wishing to limit access to
others with no perceived legitimate interest or need for the records.
Congressional action predating Public Law 94-142 gave significant
protection to children and their parents by the passage of the Fain-
61. Id.
62. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 1, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h-6
(1976)).
63. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)).
64. Id. § 1412. New Mexico is the sole apparent exception. Levinson, supra note 8, at 277.
Section 504 will also be important for a child with a history of a handicap but who is not
presently defined as such, or for the child who is handicapped but not deemed to be in need
of special education and related services. See note 36, supra.
65. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976) with the regulations under § E04 at 45 C.F.R. §§
84.21-.23 (1978).
66. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976).
67. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1978).
68. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.1-.754 (1978).
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ily Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974-the so-called
"Buckley Amendment." 9 This Act specifically guarantees parents
access to their child's school records and narrowly limits access to
those same records by other persons, agencies or institutions, and
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 reiterates
and reinforces the provisions of the earlier Act. The legislation and
regulations specifically provide for the confidentiality of student
records with personally identifying information,0 and-state law and
regulations buttress this pervasive policy. 71 These provisions rein-
force the earlier Act by providing in detail that parents shall have
the right to inspect and review any education records relating to the
child upon request and in no event, later than 45 days after the
request has been made. 2 This broad right includes more specific
69. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513(a), 88 Stat. 571 (1974), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2,
88 Stat. 1858 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976)). The regulations issued pursuant
to this Act may be found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-.67 (1978). See generally, Carey, Students,
Parents and the School Record Prison: A Legal Strategy for Preventing Abuse, 3 J. L. & EDUC.
365 (1974); Carter, Harris & Brown, Privacy in Education: Legal Implications for Educational
Researchers, 5 J. L. & Educ. 465 (1976); Note, The Buckley Amendment: Opening School
Files for Students and Parental Review, 24 CATH. U.L. REy. 588 (1975); Note, Federal Genesis
of Comprehensive Protection of Student Educational Record Rights: The Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 61 IowA L. REV. 74 (1975).
70. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(D), 1417(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.129, -.221, -.500, -.561,
-. 563-.564, -. 571-.572, -.575-.576 (1978).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.26-.28 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. DEPT. OF EDUC., MANAGEMENT
OF THE STUDENT'S SCHOLASTIC RECORD IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF VIRGINIA (Rev. 1979); VA.
DEPT. OF EDUC., REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATION OF SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN VIRGINIA 53-60 (Rev. 1979) [hereinafter cited as VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS.J.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36, 121a. 562(a) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. RaGS. 53. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 99.11(a) (1978). The
Virginia regulations coincide with the federal regulations in requiring compliance with a
parental request for access within "forty-five (45) days after the request has been made" (VA.
SPEC. ED. REGS. 53), but the definition of "days" in the Glossary to the regulations refers to
the term as meaning "administrative working days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
officially designated holidays of the local school division." VA. SPEC. ED. REGs., Glossary 2.
This definition would not appear to be consistent with the intent of either Act or their
regulations as allowing for extensive delays by a local school division when a request is made
shortly prior to a vacation period so that action could be delayed for ten or eleven weeks. Even
without an intervening vacation, the definition would require only compliance within about
nine weeks, or some 63 calendar days. The Bureau of Education for the Handicapped takes
the view that all "days" are intended to be calendar days. Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped Policy Letter to Frederick Weintraub, September 25, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:67
(1979). VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.26.1. (Cum. Supp. 1979) seems to give a right to access simply
upon appearance "in person during regular hours of the school day and request to see such
records."
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rights to: 1) explanation and interpretation of the records upon
reasonable request; 3 2) copies of the records at only the reasonable
cost of reproduction;74 3) access by an authorized representative of
the parents to the records;75 4) a list of the types of records main-
tained by the agency and the location of these records; 6 5) request
the amendment of the records if the parent believes the records are
inaccurate, misleading or violative of the privacy or other rights of
the child;77 6) notice by the agency of the fact that personally identi-
fiable information collected under the Act is no longer needed and
the right to destruction of nonessential information upon request;78
and 7) consent before personally identifiable information is dis-
closed to anyone other than officials of participating agencies or
used for a purpose other than that authorized by the law or regula-
tions.7" If the local educational agency disagrees with the parental
request for amendment of the records the agency shall, on request,
provide a hearing to allow the parent to challenge information in the
records that is misleading, inaccurate or violative of the child's
rights."0 If the parent's arguments at the hearing are persuasive then
the records must be amended in accordance with the earlier request.
A failure to so convince the agency, however, will nonetheless entitle
the parent to place in the records an explanation of the parent's
73. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.562(b)(1) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 53. See also 45 C.F.R. §
99.11(b)(1) (1978).
74. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.562(b)(2), -.566 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REOS. 53, 55. See also, 45
C.F.R. §§ 9.5(a)(2)(iii), -.8 (1978).
75. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.562(b)(3) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. RoS. 54. See also BEH Policy Letter
to Linda McMay, Feb. 7, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:10 (1979).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.565 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 55.
77. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.567 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 55. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2)
(1976); 45 C.F.R. § 99.20 (1978).
78. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.573 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 59-60. This provision is intended to
extend parental rights beyond those guaranteed by the Family Educational Rights and Pri-
vacy Act. Bureau of Education for the Handicapped Policy Letter to W. Duane Miller, August
25, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:61 (1979). The policy letters are policy interpretations from the State
Policy and Administrative Review Branch of the Division of Assistance to States, Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, provided in
response to letters of inquiry. They will hereinafter be cited as: BEH Po]icy Letter to ......
date ..... EHLR .... (1979). See also 45 C.F.R. § 99.13(1978).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.571 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 58. See also 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(2)(A), -(b)(4)(B) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 99.30-.31 (1978).
80. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.568-.570 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 56-58. Sce also 45 C.F.R. §§
99.21-.22 (1978).
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position, and this explanation must be maintained so long as the
records are retained and must accompany every transmission of the
contested records to any other party." The regulations also require
that the child be "afforded rights of privacy similar to those afforded
to parents, taking into consideration the age of the child and type
or severity of disability. 82 This provision seems unduly vague and
less than amply protective of the child's privacy rights which may
not be consonant with the privacy rights of the parent. 3
B. Identification, Evaluation and Testing of the Handicapped
Child
The law and regulations place an affirmative obligation on school
officials to locate and evaluate children who are handicapped or
suspected of being handicapped. 4 However, a parent may also initi-
ate an evaluation of his or her child based on concerns born of
perceived difficulties on the part of the child, as may physicians,
teachers, social workers or others in contact with the child. The
child may not be evaluated or tested without parental consent and
the 1975 legislation and implementing regulations mandate paren-
tal involvement at every stage of the evaluation and placement
process." Regardless of the identity of the person or agency initiat-
81. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.569; VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 56-7.
82. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.574 (1978). The Virginia Code goes even further and provides that
local school boards may require written parental consent before a child can obtain access to
his or her school records. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.26.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
83. The Supreme Court has recognized that in certain circumstances a child may have
privacy rights independent of his or her parents and independently enforceable. Bellotti v.
Baird, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (1979); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976). Thus far, the Court's definition of this right of privacy has been limited to abortion
and contraception access cases and the Court has viewed the rights of children vis-a-vis their
parents in a more limited light. Parham v. J. R., 99 S.Ct. 2493 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972). Here, the privacy interest to be asserted for the child is against the
schools and not the parents and should be given broader recognition and fuller protection.
Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(C), -1414(a)(1)(A), -1417(a)(1)(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.32,
121a.128, -.220 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 6, 11-12. See also Mattie T. v. Holladay, Civil
Actin No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 26, 1979): P-1 v. Shedd, No. 78-58,
3 EHLR 551:164 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 1979).
85. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii), -1415(b)(1)(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.500, -503-504
(1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 15. See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.35 (1978).
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ing the evaluation process, there must be written notice to the par-
ents which must be in the native language or other mode of commu-
nication of the parent and in language understandable to the gen-
eral public. This notice must contain: 1) a full explanation of the
procedural safeguards mandated and provided; 2) a description of
the actions proposed and the options available; 3) a description of
each evaluation record, test or report used by the agency; and 4) a
description of any other factors that may be relevant to the decision-
making process.8" The tests and materials used in the evaluation
process must not be racially or culturally discriminatory, 87 and they
must be provided and administered in the child's native language
or mode of communication unless it is clearly not feasible to do So. 88
The evaluation process must be complete, individually tailored to
the child and administered by a multidisciplinary t:eam of trained
personnel including at least one teacher or other specialist with
knowledge in the area of suspected disability. 9 The iests and evalu-
ative materials must be validated for the specific purpose for which
they are used and must be selected and administered so as to
achieve credible results (even though the child has impaired sen-
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.500, .503, .504 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS. 15, 43-35. The admonition to use the parents' "native language" i13 defined in the same
sense as that term is used in the Bilingual Education Act and means " . . . the language
normally used by that person, or in the case of a child, the language normally used by the
parents of the child." 20 U.S.C. §§ 880b-1(a)(2), 1401(21), 1415(b)(1)(D) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §
121a.9 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS., Glossary 6.
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 530(b) (1978); V.k. SPEc. ED. REGs. 16
(this provision was not included in the Virginia regulations until the L979 revision).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C)(1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a)(1)(1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS.
16. The "native language" requirement is defined in other provisions. See note 86 supra. The
"other mode of communication" provision seems to contemplate sign language, braille, or oral
communication if a child is deaf or blind, or has no written language See comment to 45
C.F.R. § 121a.9 (1978). That same comment contemplates the use of "the language normally
used by the child and not that of the parents, if there is a difference b 9tween the two." Id.
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.35, 121a.532-.533 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS. 16-17. The evaluation process in Virginia is frequently triggered by the local school
screening committee which will determine eligibility for evaluation. VA. SPEC. ED. REGS.
14-15. After evaluation is completed, an eligibility committee will determine the child's
eligibility for special education and related services, as was true pror to the passage of
Pub. L. No. 94-142. Id. at 20-21. However, the role of the eligibility committee is much more
limited than before and the group has no power to name a placement or specify services. Id.
at 20. Eligibility committees in Virginia are continuing to assure an unduly broad role and
the advocate should be alert to prevent the usurpation of the role of the IEP meeting. The
evaluation, eligibility and IEP roles must be kept separate and distinct.
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sory, manual or speaking skills) and the assessment must include"all areas related to the suspected disability including, where ap-
propriate, health, vision, hearing, social and emotional status, gen-
eral intelligence, academic performance, communicative status,
and motor abilities.""0 The evaluation process for a child with a
suspected specific learning disability parallels the general process
but includes more detailed requirements as to team composition,
diagnostic criteria and contents of the evaluation report.' The
placement decision following evaluation must be based on a variety
of information sources, including tests, teacher recommendations,
physical condition, social or cultural background and adaptive be-
havior, and it must be a group decision by knowledgeable persons.2
The decision also must be in conformity with the principle of the
least restrictive environment and has to lead to development of an
individualized education program."
If the parents refuse to consent to the initiation of the evaluation
process, the local educational agency can initiate due process pro-
ceedings to override the lack of parental consent. 4 Likewise, the
absence or unavailability of a parent is not an insurmountable im-
pediment to evaluation, since a "surrogate parent" may be utilized
to perform the parental role and act as an advocate for the child. 5
If a parent disagrees with the results of the evaluation process or
with the placement conclusions reached through that process, he or
90. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.35(b), 121a.532 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REs. 16-17.
91. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.540-.543 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 17, 19, 21. These regulations
supplement the basic regulations issued under Pub. L. No. 94-142. See also BEH Division of
Assistance to the States Bulletin #9, Apr. 19, 1978, 2 EHLR 203:04 (1979).
92. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.35(c), 121a.533 (1978). The knowledgeable persons could include a
social worker (BEH Policy Letter to Dale Almlie, Mar. 7, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:14 (1979)) or an
optometrist or opthalmologist (BEH Policy Letter to Dr. Linda J. Jacobs, July 21, 1978, 2
EHLR 211:42 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Dr. Linda J. Jacobs, August 14, 1978, 2 EHLR
211:54 (1979)).
93. Id.
94. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.504(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REas. 45; BEH Policy Letter to Frederick
J. Weintraub, May 3, 1979, 2 EHLR 211:90 (1979)..This presents one of the most troublesome
issues where the parent, normally presumed to have the child's best interests at heart, refuses
to consent to an evaluation in a situation where the teacher or school suspects the existence
of a handicapping condition. See notes 283-284 infra. Prior parental consent to evaluation,
since revoked, cannot support a new evaluation. BEH Policy Letter to Ms. Lillian Kudwa,
April 18, 1979, 2 EHLR 211:89 (1979).
95. 20 U.S. C. § 1415(b)(1)(B) (1916); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.514 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. RGs.
50-52.
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she has the right to secure an independent educational evaluation
from a source not connected with the public agency. 6 This indepen-
dent evaluation may even be secured at public expense unless the
agency can demonstrate, after a due process hearing, that the inter-
nal evaluation was appropriate.17 The results of the independent
evaluation must be considered by the agency in making a placement
decision and may be presented as evidence in any future hearing
concerning the child.18 A hearing officer also may request an inde-
pendent educational evaluation as a part.of the hearing process, and
in this instance, the evaluation will also be undertaken at public
expense."
The critical nature of the identification, evaluation and testing
processes has been amply demonstrated by a series of cases contest-
ing the use of culturally or racially biased testing procedures.' 0
Although several of the cases such as Larry P. v. Riles'01 and Hobson
v. Hansen12 were decided at a relatively early stage in the post-
segregation era of education litigation, the problem has apparently
been a persistent one as indicated by the recent decisions in Lora
v. Board of Education0 3 and Mattie T. v. Holladay."4 As pointed out
96. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 42-43.
97. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.503(b), -.506 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 42.
98. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503(c) (1978).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503(d) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 47.
100. See Dimond, supra note 6, at 1090-91; Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional
and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705 (1973); Krass, supra
note 9, at 1021-22; Shea, An Educational Perspective of the Legality of intelligence Testing
and Ability Grouping, 6 J. L. & EDuc. 137 (1977); Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public
Schools, 24 HAST. L. J. 1129 (1973); Zettel & Abeson supra note 6 at 201-05; Opening the
Schoolhouse Door supra note 7 at 54-5; Note, Educational Testing: A Challenge for the
Courts, 1973 U. ILL. L. F. 375; Note, Constitutional Law-Limiting the Use of Standardized
Intelligence Tests for Ability Grouping in Public Schools, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1564 (1973); Note,
Equal Protection and Intelligence Classification, 26 STAN. L. REv. 647 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Requirements for Standardized Ability Tests Used in EdUcation, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 789 (1973); Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the
Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1212 (1973).
101. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affl'd, 502 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F. 2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). See Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1511 (1968); Note, Hobson v. Hansen: The De Facto Limits on
Judicial Power, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1968).
103. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). Lora dealt with a strikingly high and dispropor-
tionate number of minority students in programs for the emotionally handicapped. Id. at
1213-14, 1221, 1256-64.
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above, both the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 and its implementing regulations have specifically addressed
this issue"°5 and there is an affirmative obligation on the state educa-
tional agency to monitor the performance of the local agency. This
responsibility would seem to include an assessment of the racial
proportions in various special education programs and an investiga-
tion into the reasons for any racially disproportionate assign-
ments.' Previous commentators have pointed to the inadequacies
of the procedural remedies under the Act and regulations to deal
with testing deficiencies in the absence of aggressive monitoring by
the state agency, and it has been posited that class action litigation
or similar litigative strategies may be necessary to police discrimi-
natory testing practices." 7
Less profound but equally destructive problems may inhere in the
evaluation process when parents complain about either the incom-
plete nature of the testing or the inaccuracy of the conclusions
reached. The regulations prescribe that the assessment must relate
to "all areas related to the suspected disability," but they do not
attempt to specify how many or what precise tests must be utilized
to reach a placement decision." 8 Consequently, much will be depen-
dent on whether the decision-makers construe the regulative re-
quirement broadly to mandate the use of an extensive battery of
tests to insure reliability in evaluation. The risks of misclassification
and erroneous placement are so great and the consequences of incor-
rect labelling are so devastating,'' that any doubts about the pro-
104. Civil Action No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 26, 1979). The dispro-
portion in this case appeared in programs for the mentally retarded. Slip op. at 3, 17-24.
105. Supra note 87.
106. It would seem that the State educational agency overseeing local compliance with the
law and regulations under 45 C.F.R. § 121a.601 (1978) could engage in the same threshhold
statistical analysis relied upon by the courts in Lora and Mattie T. to filter out serious racial
and cultural disproportions in certain programs. A failure to pursue such an analysis would
appear to be an abdication of the monitoring responsibilities clearly mandated by the law.
107. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1116. Pursuit of remedies under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976)) would not necessitate the
demonstration of a discriminatory intent seemingly required by the 1975 legislation. See Lora
v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1277-78, 1292 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
108. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(f) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 16.
109. See Sorgen, The Classification Process and Its Consequences, in Tha MENTALLY RE-
TARDED CrrrzEN AND THE LAW 215, 218-19 (1976). The judge in Lora acknowledged the risks
and dangers of misclassification as being very real and profound. 456 F. Supp. at 1265.
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priety of ordering additional testing should be resolved in favor of
completeness in testing.11 Disagreements between experts will also
create difficult decisions for hearing officers especially in light of the
accustomed deference paid to experts by lay decisionmakers."'
However, these are decisions that must be made and cannot be
avoided by what sometimes appears to be a simplistic presumption
in favor of school experts.
C. The Individualized Education Program
A major innovation included in the 1975 legislation is the man-
dated development of an individualized education program (IEP)
for each handicapped child at the conclusion of the evaluation pro-
cess, with a further annual review requirement."' The Act develops
a natural progression in its requirements by first defining handi-
capped children in the context of specific disabilities," 3 by next
defining special education to include the concept of "specially de-
signed instruction. . . to meet the unique needs of a handicapped
child,""' and then by describing related services as ancillary serv-
ices to be provided "as may be required to assist the handicapped
child to benefit from special education." 11' 5 The phrase
110. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1115. Congress expressed major concern over
"erroneous classification" - S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27, reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450-51.
111. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1115. A further difficult issue increasingly will be
presented in the future by the currently popular mandatory competency tests and their
impact on handicapped children. McClung, Competency Testing: Potential for
Discrimination, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 439 (1977); McClung & Pullin, Competency Testing
and Handicapped Students, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE Rxv. 922 (1978).
112. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18) & (19), -1414(a)(5) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §$. 84.33(b), 121a.4(d),
-.130, -.235, -.340-.349 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.4.B (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS. 26-32.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.3(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 6-11.
114. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.3(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS., Glossary 12.
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS., Glossary
10; BEH Policy Letter to Barbara Sturm, June 7, 1978, 2 EHLR 21 [:33 (1979). "Related
services" may include such services as social work (BEH Policy Letter to David M. Rosen,
Dec. 19, 1977, 2 EHLR 211:1 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to David Rosen, Aug. 18, 1978, 2
EHLR 211:7 (1979)); chiropractic (BEH Policy Letter to Carl M. Haltom, Mar. 31, 1978, 2
EHLR 211:18 (1979)); optometry (BEH Policy Letter to Dr. James W. Clark, Jr., Aug. 2, 1978,
2 EHLR 211:43 (1979)); and psychotherapy by someone other than a psychiatrist (BEH Policy
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"individualized education program" is specifically defined in the
Act to mean:
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any
meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an
intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or
supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or
guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of edu-
cational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals,
including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the
specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the
extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educa-
tional programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated
duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and
evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an
annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved."'
Thus, initially, the IEP must be developed at a meeting with certain
specified persons participating: 1) a special education administra-
tive specialist from the local educational agency or its regional coun-
terpart; 2) the child's teacher or teachers; 3) the parents or guard-
ian; 4) the child, where appropriate; 5) other individuals at the
discretion of the parents or agency; and 6) either a member of the
evaluation team or some other previously named participant who is
knowledgeable about the evaluation procedures used and is familiar
with the evaluation results when the IEP meeting is pursuant to an
initial evaluation." 7 Each of these specified participants has an
important role to play in placement decision-making. The special
education administrator has a broader view than any other partici-
pant of the available resources within the school system to meet the
child's perceived needs. The teacher or teachers are frequently going
Letter to Robert F. Millman, June 5, 1979, 2 EHLR 211:104 (1979)). Hearing aids and
psychotherapy if defined as medical services are not included as related services. BEH Policy
Letter to Raphael Minsky, April 7, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:19 (1979). It is not a violation of the
regulations or Act for the parent's insurance proceeds to go towards payment for related ser-
vices. BEH Policy Letter to Vanessa M. Sheehan, May 21, 1979, 2 EHLR 211:102 (1979).
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.340 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS.,
Glossary 5.
117. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.344 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 27-8.
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to have the major responsibility for the day-to-day delivery of serv-
ices to the child and it is thus appropriate that they have a voice in
the planning and placement of the child. The teacher participation
will also afford a fuller understanding of the parent's attitudes and
a deeper knowledge of what has transpired between the administra-
tors and evaluators on the one hand and the parents on the other. 1 8
Parental participation is pursuant to a major policy of the Act and
is also a necessary prerequisite to the development of any meaning-
ful partnership between the school and the home in dealing with the
special needs of the handicapped child."9 The participation of the
child may also be critical to the development of a meaningful pro-
gram, especially where the child has the maturity and capacity to
contribute to the decision-making process. Exclusion of the child
may be assumed out of habit as children have generally been solely
the consumers of educational services with no voice in determining
the character of those services. The "other individuals" regulation
permits the inclusion of persons other than those listed despite the
expressed preferences for the IEP meeting to be small.' 0 An appro-
priate inclusion pursuant to this provision would be an attorney or
lay advocate for the parent or child who may be inarticulate or feels
intimidated by school personnel. The last participant, either a
member of the evaluation team or some other person familiar with
the evaluation process and its conclusions, is intended to be in-
cluded only in the first IEP meeting following on bhe heels of the
initial evaluation process.'
The second facet to the IEP as set forth in the statutory definition
is the development of a written statement incorporating the indivi-
dualized educational program decided upon at the meeting. 2 This
statement must include the five provisions delineated in the Act in
items (A) through (E). These items are obviously predicated on the
assumption that if a decision is made to provide special education
118. See BEH Policy Letter to Brenda Fox, May 3, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:26 (1979).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.345 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 28-9.
120. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.344(a)(5) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 27.
121. 45 C.F. R. § 121a.344(b) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 27-8.
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.346 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. RFGS.
26. There is a very strong policy in favor of the comprehensive nature of the IEP. P-1 v. Shedd,
No. 78-58, 3 EHLR 551:164, 171 (D. Conn Mar. 23, 1979); BEH/DAS Bull. #5, Nov. 17, 1977,
2 EHLR 203:2 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Donald Clark, Mar. 29, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:17
(1979).
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for a handicapped child, then it should be "possible to state what
that child's unique needs are, what objective is desired, what is
required to achieve it, how long it should reasonably take, and how
it will be determined whether or not it has been achieved."' 3 The
IEP also must include an assessment of the extent to which the child
can participate in a normal education program, a mandated focus
on the policy of the least restrictive environment.1 24 The parent must
be given a written copy of the IEP on request, 121 and, although the
IEP is not characterized as being contractual in nature, the regula-
tions assert that "each public agency must provide special educa-
tion and related services to a handicapped child in accordance with
an individualized education program."'2 8 The Act requires that the
IEP meeting must be held within thirty calendar days of a determi-
nation that the child needs special education, 17 a review of the IEP
must be held periodically and in no event less frequently than once
a year,rs the IEP must be in effect before special education and
related services are provided,' and it must be implemented as soon
as possible following the IEP meeting or meetings.130 Finally, the
due process procedures for reviewing special education decisions
may be triggered by the parents to assess the decisions contained
in the individualized educational program.' 3' The formalized, indi-
123. Weintraub, Understanding the Individualized Education Program (IEP), Aimcus 26,
at 30 (April 1977).
124. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.346(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 29.
125. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.345(f) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 29.
126. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.349 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 27. The regulations also state in the
same section, however, that Part B of the Act does not require that any agency, teacher, or
other person be held accountable if a child does not achieve the growth projected in the
annual goals and objectives. Id. This does not detract from possible accountability if the
schools do not deliver on the promised program of instruction and services. The court in
Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978), pointed to
the possibility of school board member liability under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975), if there is a blatant failure to perform their obligations. Id. at 638.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.343(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 26. See also BEH Policy Letter
to Bob Van Osdol, Oct. 12, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:72 (1979).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 343(d) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 26.
129. 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 342(b) (1) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 26.
130. 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 342(b)(2) (1978). The Virginia Regulation provides for implementa-
tion within thirty calendar days after the determination of need for special education is made.
VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 26.
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E), (b)(2) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.506 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REs. 45.
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vidualized educational program is the first generalized legal embod-
iment of a long held ideal of designing educational programs tai-
lored to the needs of the individual child and it is probably the key
to any success for the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975.
D. The Surrogate Parent and the Handicapped Child in State or
Other Public Agency Care
The Act and regulations recognize that there are many handi-
capped children who are not in the custody or care of their natural
parents or legal guardians. The legislation speaks of the establish-
ment of:
procedures to protect the rights of the child whenever the parents or
guardian of the child are not known, unavailable, or the child is a
ward of the State, including the assignment of an individual (who
shall not be an employee of the State educational agency, local edu-
cational agency, or intermediate educational unit involved in the
education or care of the child) to act as a surrogate for the parents or
guardian.'32
The Act thus contemplates the use of a surrogate parent in three
instances: 1) where no "parent," including a natural parent, a
guardian, a person acting as a parent (in legal terms, in loco
parentis),ln or a surrogate parent can be identified., 2) where the
agency, after reasonable efforts, cannot locate the parents, and 3)
where the child is considered to be a ward of the state under the laws
of the state.1U The responsible public agency has the obligation to
determine the need for a surrogate parent and to assign a person to
serve as the surrogate parent for a child. '35 The surrogate parent is
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(B) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.10,-.514 (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. 50-52; O'Donnell, An Advocate's View: The Role of the Surrogate Parent, Amicus
28 (June, 1977).
133. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.10 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. Glossary 7. A "foster parent" may be
included in this definition. BEH Policy Letter to Barbara Robbin, Feb. 28, 1978, 2 EHLR
211:12 (1979).
134. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.514(a) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. RaGS. 51.
135. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.514(b) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 51. The state agency itself cannot
serve as the surrogate parent where it has custody of the child. BEH Policy Letter to Mary
Ann Kish, Aug. 8, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:49 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Bob Van Osdol, Oct.
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to be selected in accordance with state law and must have no con-
flict of interest with the child while at the same time having the
knowledge and skills to insure adequate representation for the
child. 3' The surrogate parent may not be an employee of either the
agency caring for the child or the education agency although there
is no disqualification flowing simply from compensation of the sur-
rogate solely for performing that role by one of the agencies. 37
The Act and regulations leave many questions unanswered in this
critical area. They would appear to allow the use of a surrogate
parent in every instance where a child is a ward of the state even
though the parents may be known or available or where there may
be a foster parent or other individual acting in loco parentis who is
committed td serving as an advocate for the child. They do not
effectively deal with the situation where a child is eligible for repre-
sentation by a surrogate parent but where custody is in a recalci-
trant or insensitive agency or when the child is not being provided
an appropriate education by an unaggressive educational agency.
Who triggers the designation of a surrogate parent in these
situations? Also, the Act and regulations deal only superficially with
the parent who refuses to consent to evaluation or to the provision
of special education and related services and do not seem to contem-
plate the use of a surrogate parent in this situation.
E. Transportation
Handicapped children frequently need specialized transportation
resources either in the form of more extensive transportation to
special education centers where a normal school placement is not
appropriate or in vehicles specially adapted to the needs of handi-
capped children or transportation with closer personal supervision
of the children carried. The 1975 Act and its regulations list trans-
portation as one of the "related services" included in the "free ap-
propriate public education" mandated for handicapped children. 3
12, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:72 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Roger W. Brown, May 16, 1979, 2
EHLR 211:100 (1979).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.514(c) (1978); VA. SPEc. ED. REos. 51-2.
137. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.514(d) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. IEGS. 52.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1978); VA. SPEc. ED. REGS. Glossary
10.
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The regulations further define "transportation" to include: "(i)
Travel to and from school and between schools, (ii) Travel in and
around school buildings, and (iii) Specialized equipment (such as
special or adapted buses, lifts, and ramps), if required to provide
special transportation for a handicapped child."'39 Parents and ad-
vocates should be careful to insure that the child's individualized
educational program specifically provides for any specialized trans-
portation requirements and that these requirements are spelled out
in detail.
F. Private and Institutional Placements
One of the most frequent sources of conflict between the parents
and the local educational agency is whether the public school sys-
tem can provide an "appropriate" program for the child or whether
that program can only be provided by either a private day or resi-
dential placement.' Parents often question the effectiveness of the
public programs and desire that the costs, often expensive, of a
private placement be paid by the public agency. The critical issue
is whether the local educational agency is capable of providing a
"free appropriate public education" within the parameters of its
presently developed programs. The initial questions involved in
addressing this issue are whether the evaluation would appear to
call for a unique and specialized form of remediation and whether
the "individualized educational program" dictates a residential or
other private placement for the provision of such services not avail-
able in the public school system's programs. Conflict inheres in
these determinations as the parents usually assert that certain serv-
ices, publicly unavailable, are required by the law while the repre-
sentatives of the local educational agency, often motivated by fiscal
considerations, urge that "appropriateness" may be found at a
lesser level of services, and within the public system.'4 ' Many hear-
139. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(13) (1978). See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(c)(2) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. Glossary 13-14. If summer transportation is provided to non-handicapped children,
then it must be provided to handicapped children. Office for Civil Rights Section 504 Letter
to Douglas T. McGarvie, May 11, 1978, 2 EHLR 254:02 (1979).
140. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1125. Parents are frequently distrustful of the
schools where their handicapped child is concerned and will only trust a outside placement.
141. Id. at 1109-10, n. 43, 1123. As this commentator points out, there is "an incentive to
identify handicapped children but not to place them in expensive schools." Id. at 1109, n.
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ings flow from this essential conflict and the necessary clash be-
tween parents desiring the best possible private program and educa-
tors who might desire to place even a severely handicapped child in
a regular classroom to minimize the financial impact.
"Appropriateness" usually falls somewhere in the middle ground
between these two extreme positions. One commentator suggests
defining "appropriateness in relation to the actual level of educa-
tional services provided for most children within a given school
system." ' This would seem to be consistent with the standard es-
tablished by the regulations under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act which speak of an "appropriate education" as being one
"designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped per-
sons as adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons are met
.... *,, A second issue is presented by the requirement of placing
the child in the least restrictive environment which presumably
would militate against an institutional or private placement.144
If the parents successfully urge that an appropriate program can
only be provided in a private placement, or if the local educational
agency agrees to such a placement as a part of the IEP, then the
handicapped child must be guaranteed all the rights there as if
served directly by the public agency and must be provided special
education and related services: 1) pursuant to an IEP under the Act
and regulations; 2) at no cost to the parents; and 3) at a school or
facility that meets all the standards that apply to public agencies."'
If parents determine to place their handicapped child in a private
school or facility despite the availability of a free appropriate public
education, they may do so at their own expense but the local educa-
tional agency must still make available the special education and
43. See, e.g., Ladson v. Board of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia Govt., Civ. Action No. 78-
2263, 3 EHLR 551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979); Michael P. v. Maloney, Civ. Action No. 78-
545, 3 EHLR 551:155 (D.Conn. Mar. 21, 1979; Matthews v. Campbell, Civ. Action No. 78-
0879-R (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp.
136 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Jones, - Misc. 2d 4258 (Fain. Ct. Queens Co.
1979); In re Scott K., 92 Misc. 2d 681, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1977).
142. Id. at 1125.
143. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1)(i) (1978).
144. See text accompanying footnotes 148 through 166 infra.
145. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.33(c)(3) -(4), 121a.302, -.347, -.400-.403 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGs.
23, 30-31. This would include such expenses as room and board. BEH Policy Letter to David
W. Hornbeck, Aug. 29, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:65 (1979).
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related services provided to other handicapped children in the
school district. 14
A child in a private school other than specifically for special edu-
cation services is defined as a "private school handicapped child"
and is entitled to such special education and related. services as are
provided to public school children.1 47 Particular regulations have
been promulgated to govern the provision of services that."are com-
parable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those
provided to public school children with needs of equal import-
ance." 148
Despite the regulations and due process procedures provided to
resolve conflicts arising under the Act, disputes over the appropri-
ateness of public programs and the need for placement in a private
school or facility will inevitably occupy much of the time of hearing
officers and school divisions.
G. The Least Restrictive Environment
Probably the most controversial provision of the 1975 legislation
is the strong mandate for placement of handicapped children in the
least restrictive environment, what is sometimes referred to as"mainstreaming. '14 The strongest statement in the Act is contained
in a directive that State educational agencies establish:
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, hand-
icapped children, including children in public or private institutions
or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handi-
capped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of handicapped children from the regular educational environment
146. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.403(a) (1978); VA.Spac. ED. REGS. 32-33.
147. 45 C.F. R. §§ 121a.450, -.452-.456 (1978); VA.SPEc. ED. REGS. 22-34.
148. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.455(b) (1978); VA.SPEc. ED. RaGS. 34.
149. Abeson, Education for Handicapped Children in the Least Restrictive Environment,
TIM MENTALLY RETARDED CrrizEN AND Tm LAW 514 (1976); Abeson, The Educational Least
Restrictive Alternative, 2 Amicus 23 (June, 1977); Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's
Civil Rights as it Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate Main-
streaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Zettel and Abeson supra note 6 at 2a3-11; Comment, The
Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, supra note 6, at 672-77;
Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1118-24; Opening the Schoolhouse Door supra note 7 at
53-4.
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occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily .... "I
The regulations provide even more extensively for a major empha-
sis on the principle of the least restrictive environment, including a
mandated inclusion as a factor in the individualized education pro-
gram.'5 ' Whereas other focuses of the Act concentrate on the specific
services to be delivered to the handicapped child under the aegis of
a "free appropriate public education," this focus necessitates keying
in on the proper environment in which this education will be deliv-
ered. As previously discussed, the "least restrictive environment"
policy would seem to place the burden of proof on any party advo-
cating the removal of the child from the regular classroom, 5 but
neither the Act nor the regulations give much guidance for the
making of this crucial decision. 5 '
Much of the impetus for the "least restrictive environment" prin-
ciple comes from a historic mistrust for the traditionally segregated
delivery of services to handicapped children, especially for the educ-
able or trainable mentally retarded.'54 This mistrust flowed not only
from a concern that such a setting was inherently unnatural but also
from concerns that such separation had a "labelling" or stigmatiz-
ing effect, that it tended to heighten the negative impact from mis-
classification, that it minimized expectations and thus performance
from these children through a "Pygmalion effect," and that it had
become an unwitting tool for maintaining racial segregation."5
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(c)(iv), -1418(b)(1)(c)
(1976).
151. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.346(c) (1978). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.34(a), 121a.132,-.550-.556
(1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 23-24, 29, 32, Glossary 5.
152. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1119.
153. Id. Cf. BEH Policy Letter to Dr. Greg Frith, Dec. 26, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:84 (1979).
154. Chambers, The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative, THE MENTALmY RE-
TARDED CrrzEN D THELAW 486 (1976); Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is
Much of It Justifiable?, 35 EXCEPTIONAL CmLDanH 5 (1968); Miller & Miller, supra note 148,
at 7-8; Reynolds, Framework for Considering Some Issues in Special Education, 28
EXCEPTIONAL CHmLDREN 367 (1962); Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1119-20.
155. Dunn, supra note 153, at 8-9; Miller & Miller, supra note 148, at 7; Comment, The
Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, supra note 6, at 674-5;
Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1119; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484
(D.D.C. 1967).
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These educational concerns were reinforced by the legal doctrines
evolving in litigation challenging the approaches to the civil com-
mitment of persons, especially children, to institutions.15 The con-
sent decree in PARC also gave impetus to the acceptance of the
principle when the court order required that "among the alternative
programs of education and training required by statute to be avail-
able, placement in a regular public school class i:3 preferable to
placement in a special public school class and placement in a spe-
cial public school class is preferable to placement in any other type
of program of education and training."15 7 The federal district court
in the subsequent contested case of Hairstoq v. Drosick,155 con-
cluded that exclusion of a minimally handicapped spina bifida child
from a regular public classroom situation "without a bona fide edu-
cational reason" was violative of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. " It was against this backdrop of both litigation and profes-
sional judgment that Congress incorporated the "least restrictive
environment" policy in the legislation.
The controversy over the policy has been generated from several
different sources. Educators, especially classroom teachers, have
argued that mainstreaming handicapped children without increas-
ing the training and sensitivity level of the regular classroom teacher
or reducing the class size will result in the direction of undue in-
structional attention to the exceptional child to the detriment of
normal students. 10 Special educators urge that special programs
will suffer unduly from the emphasis on regular classroom place-
ment with a resulting lag in research and program and technique
development. "' Parents and special educators assert that stigmati-
156. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and
Their Application, 12 FAm. L. Q. 153 (1978).
157. Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257,
1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972).
158. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W.Va. 1976).
159. Id. at 184. See also Matthews v. Campbell, Civ. Action No. 78-0879-R (E.D. Va. July
16, 1979); Mattie T. v. Holladay, Civil Action No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 26, 1979); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); P-1 v. Shedd, No. 78-58, 3 EHLR 551:164 (D. Conn.
Mar. 23, 1979).
160. See, e.g., Greenberg & Doolittle, Can Schools Speak the Language of the Deaf?, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 50; Milofsky, Schooling the Kids No One Wants,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 25, 28.
161. See Greenberg & Doolittle, supra note 160, at 102.
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zation will be greater in the normal classroom as the handicapped
child is increasingly set apart, isolated and shunned by his nonhan-
dicapped peers.' Parents also argue that many handicapped chil-
dren who were already in the "mainstream" when the Act was
passed, were drowning, and the perceived rescue and resuscitation
has not materialized because administrators have used the policy as
a justification for continued "dumping" of the children in a normal
classroom setting instead of providing special services.' In fact, the
utilization of "mainstreaming," which has become almost a pejora-
tive term for the least restrictive environment, has become one of
the most emotional issues for many parents and parent groups.
One perceptive commentator has urged that the best approach for
decisionmakers in this area is to apply the "maximum integration
provision as a rebuttable presumption that every child is properly
placed in the regular classroom.""' One approach urged at an earlier
point was to use what is called a "cascade system" with nine alter-
native educational placements beginning with the regular classroom
in the child's regular school and proceeding in increasingly restric-
tive placement steps to the most restrictive setting of a hospital.' 5
This technique, and others designed to enhance implementation of
such a policy,' may be effective educational tools, but more basic
issues need to be addressed. One is the need to deal with the place-
ment of a handicapped child on the basis of the level of services
needed by this specific and unique person, rather than on the basis
of a label applied after standardized testing. Second, there is a need
for a real commitment to individualized education and the variety
of resources and methods implied thereby. The third, and perhaps
most important, issue is presented by the general inadequacy of
training afforded regular classroom teachers in dealing with handi-
capped children and, equally important, the need for sensitizing"normal" children to interrelating with handicapped children.8 7
Finally, there is a profound need to intentionally blur the line be-
162. See id. at 82.
163. Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1121.
164. Id. at 1122.
165. Reynolds, supra note 154.
166. See Miller & Miller, supra note 149, at 3.
167. NATIONAL ADVisoRy COUNCIL ON EDUCATION PROFESSIONS DEvELoP Ew, MAINsTREAm-
ING: HELPING TEACHERS MEET THE CHAL.LE 18-19 (1976).
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tween regular and special education and move towards greater colla-
beration, cooperation and integration between the two. An imple-
mentation of these goals would lessen somewhat the difficult
decision-making under the administrative procedures afforded by
the Act although the implementation of the least restrictive envi-
ronment policy will always be hard.
H. Discipline and Misconduct
The question of the role of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 in student discipline decisions is an issue that
has arisen primarily in litigation since the implementation of the
Act. Paragraph 24 of the Appendix to the Regulations tinder Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 points out that "where a handi-
capped student is so disruptive in a regular classroom that the edu-
cation of other students is significantly impaired, the needs of the
handicapped child cannot be met in that environment."'' Save for
a reference to this language in a comment to Section 121a.552 of the
Regulations under Public Law 94-142,11' there is almost total silence
on this issue. However, the recent case of Stuart v. Nappi, 117 and
other later cases,1 71 have focused on the procedures to be followed
in disciplining handicapped children. In Stuart a girl was expelled
from school pursuant to normal procedures for disciplinary reasons
in spite of Planning and Placement Team recommendations regard-
ing placement and services for a severe learning disability and emo-
tional difficulties.'7 2 The court concluded that under the 1975 Act
and its Regulations there were four specific rights that were violated
in Kathy Stuart's case:
168. 45 C.F.R., Part 84, Appendix A, para. 24 (1978). This is a major issue as school
divisions will often argue that a child is dangerous to self or a threat to others in justifying
exclusion of the child from the school or from the regular classroom. See, e.g., Howard S. v.
Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); K. 13. v. Withey, Civ.
Action No. 78-288, (D.Vt. Dec. 18, 1978); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. N.Y. 1978), 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
169. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.552, Comment (1978).
170. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
171. Mattie T. v. Holladay, Civil Action No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 26, 1979); P-1 v. Shedd, No. 78-58, 3 EHLR 551:164 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 1979); S-1 v.
Turlington, Case No. 78-8020-CIV-CA, 3 EHLR 551:211 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1979). See also
Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (this is a
particularly strong decision).
172. 443 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
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(1) the right to an "appropriate public education;" (2) the right to
remain in her present placement until the resolution of her special
education complaint; (3) the right to an education in the "least re-
strictive environment;" and (4) the right to have all changes of place-
ment effectuated in accordance with prescribed procedures.'13
In light of these conclusions, the court ruled that "any changes in
plaintiff's placement must be made by a PPT after considering the
range of available placements and plaintiff's particular needs.' ' 4
The other later cases are consistent with Stuart in supporting the
concept that the 1975 Act takes precedence over the normal proce-
dures for disciplining school children if the sanction involves expul-
sion, long-term suspension or other punishments that may be
equated to a change of placement." 5
I. Complaint and Due Process Procedures
As the prior discussions have indicated, parents are afforded the
right under the Act to an adjudication of complaints or of disagree-
ments with school decisions under procedures that comport with
due process. Section 615 of the Act is devoted exclusively to"procedural safeguards" and it mandates certain minimal due pro-
cess procedures to include the following:
1) The parental right, personally and by a representative, to exam-
ine all records relevant to identification, evaluation, placement, and
the provision of a free appropriate public education;"'
2) The parental right to an independent educational evaluation of
the child; ' "
3) Procedures to provide a surrogate parent for a child where the
parents or guardians are unknown, unavailable or where the child is
a ward of the State;1 8
173. Id. at 1240.
174. Id. at 1243.
175. Supra note 171.
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36, 121a.502, -.562-.566
(1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 42.
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGs. 42-3.
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(B) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 514 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGs. 50-2.
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4) The parental right to written prior notice of any agency action
or refusal to act regarding the initiation of or change in the identifica-
tion, evaluation, educational placement or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to the child;17
5) The parental right to be provided notice in their native lan-
guage; M
6) The parental right to be advised of all the procedures available;""8
7) The opportunity for the parents to present complaints regarding
the identification, evaluation, placement, or free appropriate public
education for the child;'
8) The parental right to consent to evaluation or placement of the
child; 3
9) The agency right to a hearing on a parental refusal to consent to
evaluation or placement;'8"
10) The parental right to an impartial due process hearing regarding
any disagreement over action or refusal to act under 4) above, which
impartial due process hearing must include:'85
a) A right to be informed of any free or low-cosi. legal and other
services available; 8 6
b) A right to an impartial hearing officer who is neither an
employee of an agency involved in the education or care of the
child nor has any personal or professional interest which would
conflict with his or her objectivity;'87
c) A party's right to be accompanied and advised by counsel
179. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36, 121a.504-.505 (1978);
VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 43-4.
180. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(D) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.505(b)(2) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. 44.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(D) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.505(a)(1) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REs. 43.
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976).
183. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.504(b) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 45.
184. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.504(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 45.
185. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36, 121a.506 (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. 45.
186. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.506(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REOS. 46.
187. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.507 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS. 46, Glossary 4. See also Campochiaro v. Califano, Civil No. H-78-64 (D.Conn. May 18,
1978). This disqualifies local school board members or other employees of the agency directly
involved in the delivery of educational services. BEH Policy Letter to Walter P. Kennedy,
Jan. 20, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:07 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Glenn Vergason, April 19, 1978,
2 EHLR 211:21 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Charles L. Kettler, Aug. 11, 1978, 2 EHLR
211:51 (1979); BEH Policy Letter to Lynne Cannon, Sept. 20, 1978, 2 EFHLR 211:67 (1979);
Office for Civil Rights Policy Interpretation No. 6, 43 FR 36036, Aug. 14, 1978, 2 EHLR 251:03
(1979).
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and by experts;Iu
d) The right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine
and compel the attendance of witnesses;'"9
e) The right to exclude evidence not disclosed to the party at
least five days prior to the hearing;"'
f) The right to a written or electronic verbatim record of the
hearing;"'
g) The right to obtain written findings of fact and decision;9 2
h) The parental right to have the child in question present at
the hearing;" 3
i) The parental right to have the hearing open to the public."'
11) The parental right to limit accrisibility to educational records
of their child to officials of edu dtional agencies;"5 and
12) The right to timely and expeditious procedures, including
a) Screening all children for certain handicaps within 60
school days of initial enrollment in a public school;'"
b) Action by a local school scieening committee on children
referred after screening within 10 school days;"'
c) Initiation of formal assessment of suspected handicapped
children by the special education administrator within 20 school
days of referral by the local school screening committee;"'
d) A determination of eligibility for special education and re-
lated services within 45 school days of the initiation of formal
evaluation procedures regardless of the initiator;"'
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36, 121a.508(a)(1) (1978); VA.
SPEC. ED. REGS. 47.
189. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508(a)(2) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. 47.A BEH Policy Letter indicates that a subpoena power would exist. BEH Policy
Letter to Gail Imobensteg, Mar. 8, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:15 (1979).
190. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508(a)(3) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REws. 47.
191. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(3) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508(a)(4) (1978); VA. SPEC.
ED. REGS. 47.
192. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(4) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508(a)(5) (1978); VA. SPEC.ED. REGS. 47. The findings and decisions, after deletion of personally identifiable information,
must be transmitted to the State advisory panel.
193. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508(b)(1) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 47.
194. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.S08(b)(2) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGs. 47.
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 99.30-.31, 121a.571 (1978); VA.
SPEC. ED. REGS. 58-9.
196. VA. SPEC. ED. REGs. 13.
197. Id. at 14.
198. Id. at 14-15.
199. Id. at 17.
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e) Development of an individualized educational program and
placement within 30 calendar days of a determination that the
child needs spcial education and related services; °0
f) Access to education records prior to an IEP meeting or hear-
ing and in no case more than 45 school days after the request
has been made;"0 '
g) A final decision from a local hearing officer no later than 45
school days after receipt of a request for a hearing and the post-
ing of a copy of the decision by mail within the same period;02
and
h) A final decision from a state hearing officer on review no
later than 30 school days after receipt of a request for a review
and posting of a copy of the decision by mail within the same
period. 0
The federal and state regulations would appear to avoid the long
periods of delay that have marked evaluation and placement in the
past but the time limitations would still seem to allow for considera-
ble foot-dragging.' In general, however, the administrative proce-
dures afforded by the Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant
to it provide far more extensive due process rights that would proba-
bly be ordered by the courts at this time.25 Much of the success of
the Act will be dependent upon the objectivity and dedication of
hearing officers at the local and State level and upon the availabil-
ity, knowledge and dedication of lawyers and lay advocates to repre-
sent and advise parents and their children.
200. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.343(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REcs. 26.
201. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.562(a) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 53.
202. 45 c.F.R. § 121a.512(a) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 49.
203. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.512(b) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 49-50.
204. As pointed out in note 72, supra, the failure of the federal and state regulations to
define the term "days" as meaning calendar days and, indeed, the active definition of the
term in the State regulations to mean school days allows for excessive delay in the process
from the time of an initial suspicion of a handicap to completion of due process procedures.
A BEH Policy Letter opines that all timelines are intended to mean calendar days. BEH
Policy Letter to Frederick Weintraub, Sept. 25, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:67 (1979).
205. The recent Supreme Court decisions in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) and Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) would
not instill optimism regarding an expansive definition of due process by that Court in the
absence of very precise statutes or regulations. See also Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
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J. State Appeal and Review
The local hearing procedure is not the end of the due process
afforded to the parties since "any party aggrieved by the findings
and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to the State
educational agency which shall conduct an impartial review of such
hearing." The Act mandates that the "officer conducting such
review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such
review. ' ' 21 At this appellate stage the hearing officer must
1) Examine the entire record of the hearing below;08
2) Insure that the local hearing procedures comported with due pro-
cess;28
3) Seek additional evidence if necessary, and this would presuma-
bly include the right to order an independent evaluation; 20
4) Afford the same procedural rights guaranteed to the parties at
the local hearing if additional evidence is heard;211
5) Give the parties an opportunity for oral or written argument, or
both in the officer's discretion;212
6) Make an independent decision;213
7) Give a copy of written findings and the decision to the parties;24
and
8) Act within 30 school days after receipt of a request for a review.215
The decision of the State review hearing officer is final unless a civil
action is brought in a court to overturn the conclusion reached.2 1,
206. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(a) (1978); VA. SPEc. ED.
REGS. 48.
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b) (1978); VA. SPEc. ED.
RErs. 48.
208. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(1) (1978); VA. SPEc. ED. REGS. 48.
209. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(2) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 48.
210. 45 C.F.R. 99 121a.503(d), -. 510(b)(3) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. ERG. 48.
211. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(3) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 48.
212. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(4) (1978); .VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 48.
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(5) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REos. 48.
214. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(b)(6) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 48.
215. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.512(b) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGs. 49-50.
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.510(c) (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGs. 48.
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K. Litigation
The 1975 Act not only mandates the development of an extensive
and sophisticated administrative procedural system for the provi-
sion of due process when conflicts arise, but it also provides for
access to the courts upon the completion of administrative proce-
dures. The Congress provided in the legislation that.:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under
[local due process procedures] . . . who does not have the right to
an appeal under [state review procedures] . . . . and any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision under [state review proce-
dures] . . . , shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect
to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action
may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a
district court of the United States without regard to the amount in
controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision
on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate." '
The .judicial remedy thus defined is a review of the administrative
process at the local and state level, both substantive and proce-
dural. It would seem to require an exhaustion of the administrative
remedies although the analysis of the regulations that accompany
these rules leaves this question open."'1 A recent district court deci-
sion supports this view while agreeing that the willful refusal of a
local agency to afford "any education whatsoever" in clear violation
of the Act or an inadequate or absent administrative process might
excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.2' Some of the
217. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.511 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED.
REGS. 49. The judicial review provision clearly contemplates an independent evaluation by
the court. Ladson v. Board of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia Govt., Civ. Action No. 78-2263,
3 EHLR 551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979).
218. See comment regarding J 121a.511 in Appendix A to 45 C.F.R. Part 121a.
219. Harris v. Campbell, Civ. Action No. 78-0929-R (E.D. Va. June 15, 1979). See also
Mark T. v. McDaniel, Div. Action No. C79-222A, 3 EHLR 551:214 (N.D Ga, June 26, 1979).
Harris posits that if exhaustion would be futile, it would not be required as a prerequisite to
judicial intervention. See also Armstrong v. Kline, Civ. Actions Nos. 78-172, -132-133, 3
EHLR 551:195 (E.D.Pa. June 21, 1979); Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F.
Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Loughren v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979). Another
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states have followed the federal legislation by statute specifying the
"State court of competent jurisdiction" in which jurisdiction for
review of the administrative process will be lodged.20
Additional legal remedies are afforded through litigation under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act although recent decisions have
cast some doubt on the efficacy of such an approach.2 ' The adminis-
trative and judicial procedures delineated by the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act and its regulations provide more specific
and efficacious remedies for complaints in the elementary and sec-
ondary school setting although there may be exceptional situations
where other approaches will be desirable. For example, generalized
problems may dictate the utilization of class action litigation in
situations where failures to comply with the Act are so widespread
that compensatory programs not dealt with in the Act may be con-
stitutionally required. In light of these possibilities, the antece-
dent case precedents may have more than historical interest.',,
L. Administrative and Judicial Remedies for Review of Programs
The Act does not rely solely on complaint procedures for individ-
ual parents in specific cases to insure compliance with the policies
and procedures set forth in the legislation and regulations. The
statute makes the state educational agency responsible for monitor-
ing compliance with the Act and for at least annual evaluations of
case has held that the exhaustion of available administrative remedies under Pub. L. No. 94-
142 will suffice to satisfy exhaustion under Section 504. Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School
Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
220. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.4.D (Cum. Supp. 1979).
221. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
222. See Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1112-13. The district court's decision in Mattie
T. v. Holladay, Civil Action No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D.Miss. Jan. 26, 1979), for
example, ordered the provision of compensatory education for persons misclassified or inade-
quately educated even beyond the twenty-first birthday if such is necessary to complete a
satisfactory program. Slip op. at 29-31, 3 EHLR at 551:118. This was a consent decree in a
clasA action proceeding. See also Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., Civ. Action
No. 79-1006, 3 EHLR 551:190, 191-2 (D.D.C. May 9, 1979); Miles v. Samples, Civ. Action
No. 79-0034-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 1979) (consent decree).
223. Handel, supra note 9; Enforcing the Right supra note 7 at 1112-13; See text at notes
12-27. Two recent cases have splot over whether a private claim for damages exists under
P.L. No. 94-142. Compare Loughran Q. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979) (no dam-
age claim) with Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (compensatory damage claim may be appropriate).
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program effectiveness.2 4 The state agency must prepare an annual
plan for submission to the United States Commissioner of Educa-
tion 2 15 and the local educational agency must likewise submit an
annual application to the state.28 These plans and applications are
reviewed by the monitoring agency for compliance with the Act and
regulations and also are compared with performance to ascertain
the existence of any gulf between the two. 27 The respective plans
and applications may be disapproved by the reviewing agency and
funds may be withheld for noncompliance or inadequacy of perform-
ance228 although extensive administrative procedures are estab-
lished to insure due process in agency review. 29 There is also a
provision for judicial review of action by the Commissioner in regard
to the state plan. 0
A generalized administrative remedy is also provided for a parent
or parents concerned with noncompliance with the Act or regula-
tions through the filing of a complaint with either the Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped or the Office of Civil Rights for the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare pur-
suant to procedures established under Title VI of the Civil Rights
224. 20 U.S.C. §9 1412(6), 1413(a)(11) & (b), 1414(b) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.2,
-.146, -.193-.194, -.236, -.600-.602 (1978); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 2-3; Mattie T. v. Holladay, Civ.
Action No. DC-75-31-S, 3 EHLR 551:109 (N.D.Miss. Jan. 26, 1979); P-1 v. Shedd, No. 78-
58, 3 EHLR 551:164 (D.Conn. Mar. 23, 1979).
225. 20 U.S.C. 99 1412(2), 1413, 1416 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.2(b), -. 110-.151
(1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGs. 1-2. The annual
plan required by statute and by the implementing regulations can be a very useful tool for
the advocate in determining the extent of local compliance with the standards established
by the State and for serving as a litmus in testing the adequacy of a local program. The annual
program plan for the State may serve as an eloquent expert witness on what constitutes
minimum standards for operation of a special education program, and one to which the
hearing officer, especially at the state level, must pay extraordinary deference.
226. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.220-.240 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. §
22-10.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 35-7. The local annual application can be
just as useful to the advocate as the State annual program plan as discussed in note 224 supra.
227. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(c), 1414(b), 1418 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.113,-.193, -. 601
(1978).
228. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d), 1416 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.194,-.590 (1978); VA.
CODE ANN. § 22-10.4.E (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 71.
229. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b), 1416 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.194, -.580-.583 (1978);
VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 60-2.
230. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(b) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.593 (1978). The Virginia regula-
tions similarly provide for judicial review of action by the State Board of Education regarding
the local application. VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 62.
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Act of 1964.13 Issues may also be addressed to the State Advisory
Panel on the Education of Handicapped Children mandated by the
1975 Act and its regulations.3 2
III. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR THE ADVOCATE REPRESENTING THE
HANDICAPPED CHILD AND His OR HER PARENTS.
With the litigative, legislative and administrative backdrop or
tapestry firmly in place, the legal or lay advocate must now consider
specific strategies and tactics for securing a free appropriate public
education for his or her handicapped client. As is true in any area
of the law, knowledge of the substantive and procedural backdrop
is essential, but it is useless without consideration of the advocacy
and representational skills that are the necessary tools for working
with the raw materials provided by this knowledge. This portion of
the article will focus on these skills and give suggestions from one
person's perspective for providing effective representation to a client
seeking an appropriate education.2 The suggestions will attempt to
track the chronology of events as they will normally occur in a case
of this nature.
A. Parental Contact
The initial involvement of the lawyer or advocate will generally
come through contact by one or both of the child's parents seeking
advice concerning their handicapped child's education. The parents
231. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1978); Children's Defense Fund, 94-142 AND 504; NUMBERS THAT ADD
UP To EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 24 (1978); Complaint Procedures
Under Sections 503 and 504, 2 AMICUS 46, (Sept., 1977). Section 84.61 of the Regulations
under Section 504 provides that the "procedural provisions applicable to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act apply" to complaints. The regulations governing such proceedings may be found
in 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.10, 81.1-.1.31 (1978). It is still too early in the implementation of Pub.
L. No. 94-142 to make a judgment as to which agency affords the best remedy for adminis-
trative review of a complaint or the more expedited treatment of same. One case has stayed
consideration of a suit until consideration of the complaint by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
232. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(12) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.147, -.650-.653 (1978). See also VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-10.13 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. SPEC. ED. REGs. 1, 3. The Virginia Regulations
also mandate the creation of a counterpart Local Advisory Committee in each locality to
perform similar functions. VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 38-40.
233. For additional perspectives see the articles cited in note 9, supra and the excellent
pamphlet prepared for parents and advocates, 94-142 AND 504: NUhIBERS THAT ADD UP TO
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN (1978).
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will very frequently be angry, frustrated and very distrustful of au-
thority figures, including possibly you. They will often have been
engaged in "combat" with the schools for some time with little
success from their perspective, and litigation may be foremost in
their minds and expressed desires. It will be very important for you
to establish a caring and trusting relationship while tactfully trying
to defuse somewhat the emotional content of the parent's atti-
tude.24 If the parents are seeking to retain you as counsel for them
and the child, you should ascertain their ability to pay a retainer,
fees and expenses for what may be protracted representation. You
should advise them of the possibly time-consuming nature of the
process and what your fees might be depending on the stage of the
process where action may be terminated. 235 If it is apparent that the
parents are and will be unable to afford private representation you
should not hesitate to refer them to the state developmental disabil-
ities protection and advocacy office established under the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act23 as amended
by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Development
Disabilities Amendments of 1978,21 or to the nearest legal aid off-
icezn or other advocacy group.25 You should also direct the parents
to any local parent and/or professional group involved with the par-
ticular handicapping condition suspected for information, counsel-
ing and general support.241 It will be important for both you and the
234. The parents of handicapped children are subjected to many preasures beyond those
that are self-generated by the simple difficulty of having a child that is less than perfect. The
sensitivity of the advocate to these pressures and this vulnerability will be often the most
important ingredient in the development of a sound professional relationship. See generally
Handel, supra note 9, at 352-3; Krass, supra note 9, at 1018, n.18.
235. See Linn, How Much Is That Lawyer in the Window?, AMcus, '14 (Jan./Feb. 1978).
236. Pub. L. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6008-6081 (1976)). See
Maloney, Advocacy Under the Developmentally Disabled Bill of Righis, AMicus 30 (Jan./
Feb., 1978).
237. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978).
238. The various legal aid programs around the country have generally been sensitized to
the educational rights of handicapped children and are willing to handle cases for eligible
parents and children.
239. Some of the advocacy groups are listed in Appendix A, infra, and other groups may
be identified through contact with law schools or the State developmental disabilities protec-
tion and advocacy office.
240. There are parent and/or professional groups for most disabilities that may be located
through the telephone directory or through the school systems. Many of the national offices
of these groups are listed in the Children's Defense Fund publication cited in note 233 supra,
at 33-4.
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parents to know as much as possible about the disability and the
resources available to remediate it as the matter proceeds. You
should also explore with the parents your relationship with them
and the child and whose attorney or advocate you are to be. 24'
B. Initial Interview
In addition to the human and personal considerations outlined
above, there is certain specific information you will need at the
initial interview and there are specific things you need the parents
to do. You need to ascertain the age, sex and present educational
placement of the child as well as what testing, evaluation or other
processes have already taken place. In other words, you want to
know what stage in the educational process has been reached prior
to contact with you. The advocate must also find out specifically
what the parents want for the child and what their source is for this
desired placement. If the child is old enough, which would be any
age covered by the Act, you should get to know the child and estab-
lish a trusting relationship with him or her. 22 If possible, you need
to talk with the child alone and find out what he or she wants. You
should also try to observe the child in his or her classroom at school
to ascertain for yourself the adjustment to the current placement.
Finally, you should secure the parents' signatures on an authoriza-
tion enabling you to secure all the school records as well as on
authorizations permitting you to obtain any relevant medical, psy-
chological, psychiatric or other records. 243
C. Obtaining Records
After securing the necessary authorizations for securing records
from the parents, you should transmit them with covering letters to
the appropriate persons and agencies. The covering letter should
remind the educational agencies of the time limits governing trans-
mittal of records and should urge that the records be expedited.
241. It is important to clarify the obligations of the advocate to the client and the identity
of the specific client-the parent or the child. See Cohen, Advocacy: Principal Paper, THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CrrizEN AND THE LAw 592 (1976). See also JUVENIn JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 77-97 (1976).
242. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 241, at 81-2.
243. See Request and Authorization for Records in Appendix B, infra.
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Keep in mind that the records sought may be kept in a variety of
locations including the child's present school, a guidance office, the
school administration office or the school psychologi3t's office.
D. School Evaluation
There are two important considerations to keep in mind with
regard to the school evaluation process. First, there are specific time
limits placed on the various stages of the evaluation process and the
advocate must monitor the school to insure that it complies with
these limits. '44 Second, you must cultivate a healthy skepticism
toward any evaluation performed by school-employed psychologists
or testers as there is a natural tendency to recommend placement
in programs already in existence and operated by the local school
agency even though such programs may not be totally appropriate
for the child.
E. Independent Evaluation
As discussed earlier, there is a fairly broad right delineated in the
Act and regulations for an independent evaluation where the par-
ents disagree with either the evaluation results or the placement
conclusions reached, and this evaluation may well be secured at
public expense.2 45 In looking for a person or clinic to perform the
evaluation, do not hesitate to consult with a protection and advo-
cacy office or another advocacy or parent group or consider the use
of any regional child development clinic.24 You should contact the
director of the clinic or the professional performing the evaluation
directly in order to establish a relationship and to speed up the
evaluation process. You might also consider -requesting that the bill
for the independent evaluation be sent directly to the local educa-
tional agency as payment might be made without questioning, and
conflict over responsibility for the costs may be avoided. The inde-
pendent evaluation report should be sent directly to you and not to
the school agency.
244. See text at notes 196-204, supra.
245. See text at notes 96-99, supra.
246. In Virginia, these clinics are operated by the Virginia Department of Health and
special education funds assist in the diagnostic aspects of the clinics. VA. SPEC. ED. REGs.
70. Contact should be made with the local health department to ascertain the location of the
nearest regional child development clinic.
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F. School Contact
The advocate should not hesitate to establish contact with the
schools in an attempt to negotiate the resolution of any conflict over
a diagnosis or a placement, but care should be exercised to insure
that any negotiations are with an appropriate person-a decision-
maker such as the special education director-rather than the
child's classroom teacher or even the school principal. Any negoti-
ated resolution of the problem should be confirmed in writing and
incorporated into the individualized educational program. Any sig-
nificant correspondence with the schools, such as confirmation of a
negotiated agreement, should be sent by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, and the receipt should be affixed to the
carbon copy of the letter in your file. It is also wise to keep the
attorney for the school system out of the picture unless he or she is
already involved or contact is necessary because of school intransi-
gency or something similar. Once you have become involved in the
matter, all contacts with the school regarding an appropriate educa-
tion should be made by or through you and the parents or other
interested persons should avoid direct contact. This will ensure that
the child's position will be presented with one consistent voice.
G. School Eligibility and Placement Committees and the Indivi-
dualized Educational Program
The School Eligibility and Placement Committee, or a similar
local school group performing the same function, has a very limited
function now in determining whether the child is handicapped and
probably in need of special education and related services. 4 The
more important role now is played by the meeting for the develop-
ment of the individualized educational program. 24 1 You should en-
sure that the cast of characters for this meeting is complete, and you
have a right to be present at the option of the parents. 249 However,
the IEP meeting is administrative and not adversarial, thus your
role at the meeting should be consistent with that character for the
meeting. The advocate should also be aware of the possibility that
247. See VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 20-21. As previously noted, not all eligibility committees
accept this more limited role and the advocate must remain alert to this. See note 89 supra.
248. See text at notes 112-131, supra.
249. See text at notes 117-121, supra.
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a pre-IEP meeting may be held by the school personnel without the
parents and this possibiltiy should be foreclosed by a letter to the
school requesting that any time a meeting is held to discuss the
child's evaluation or placement, the advocate and the parents re-
quest that they be so advised and invited. If the time for an IEP
meeting is close to the end of the school year, you should request
that the meeting be held in May or June rather than in August or
September in order to allow any administrative procedures to be
completed and a placement made prior to the start of the school
year. 2o
The advocate should ensure that the IEP specifically spells out
the following: 1) the time schedule for any services to be afforded
the child; 2) the persons or agencies who will provide these services;
3) the teacher-pupil ratio in the placement selected; 4) all of the
services needed by the child, and whether these needed services are
presently available in the system; and 5) whether the services to be
provided the child in question include summer school, psychiatric
or psychological services, medical or ancillary services, or compen-
satory programs to enable a child to catch up with his peers. 1
Any placement decision must necessarily include a balancing be-
tween the principle of the least restrictive environment and the
concept of appropriateness. This balancing process is especially cru-
cial where a residential or private placement is considered. When
the determination is made at the IEP meeting to place the child in
a residential or private setting, the advocate must ensure that the
IEP includes a provision for tuition, room and board and other
incidental expenses, and he or she should be sure that the institu-
tion is on the approved list. Also, keep in mind that the burden is
250. Since the classroom teachers are frequently not available during the summer months,
local educational agencies will often refuse to schedule an IEP meeting during that period. A
delay until the beginning of school may mean that the child starts school in one setting and
then has to move to a different setting with the negative implications such a shift may have.
251. A summer program may be necessary for compensatory purposes. See, e.g., Armstrong
v. Kline, Civ. Action Nos. 78-172, -132-133, 3 EHLR 551:195 (E.D.Pa. June 21, 1979); In re
Richard K., 3 EHLR 551:192 (N.H. June 8, 1979); BEH Policy Letter to Phyllis Torres, Aug.
8, 1978, 2 EHLR 211:50 (1979). Attention should also be paid to physical education and
athletic programs for the handicapped child. See Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190
(S.D.Tex. 1978); Kampmeier v. Harris, 93 Misc. 2d 1032, 403 N.Y.S. 2- 638 (S.Ct. Monroe
Co. 1978); BEH Policy Letter to Robert J. Browne, Jan. 3, 1979, 2 EHLR 211:87 (1979); Office
for Civil Rights Policy Interpretation No. 5, 43 FR 36035, Aug. 14, 1978, 2 EHLR 251:03
(1979).
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on the local education agency to locate the private resources and set
up a pre-placement interview. The advocate should also use care in
advising the" parents regarding a unilateral private placement be-
cause of the risk involved that they will be financially responsible
for the costs of the placement. 212
The IEP must be reviewed at least annually according to the law
but you should not simply sit back and await the passage of the year
for a review meeting to be held. If a reason exists for a re-evaluation
or new placement you should request a meeting at an earlier point.
Also, remember that pending any review the child must remain in
his or her present placement unless the child is out of school." 3
H. Notice
The Code and regulations provide very specifically for notice to
the parents, and to you if expressly requested, with necessary con-
tents of the various steps in the process-identification, evaluation
and placement, including the IEP meeting, and placement deci-
sions and any placement review.211
I. Parental Consent
The advocate has to be prepared to protect the right to parental
consent prior to evaluation or placement accorded by the law.2 5 The
role of the advocate as a counselor may be critical here where there
is any disagreement over an evaluation or placement. Where the
interests of the child dictate a certain course of action, it may be
necessary for the advocate to persuade the parents to consent to that
course.
J. Local Due Process Hearing
The most important and familiar role for the legally trained advo-
cate in representing the interests of the handicapped child will be
in appearing for the child and parents in the local due process hear-
252. See text accompanying note 146, supra. It is also possible that such a private place-
ment by the parents would preclude the treatment of such as a "present placement" for the
purpose of determining where the child remains during due process.
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.513 (1978); VA. SPEc. ED. REos. 50.
254. See text at notes 179-180, supra.
255. See text at note 183, supra.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing and state appeal hearing. This role will be closest to that per-
formed by the lawyer as an advocate in court, or at least in an
administrative hearing.
The hearing ordinarily must be held with all parties present and
any evidence to be presented at the hearing must have been dis-
closed to the opposing party at least five days prior to the hearing
to be admissible.2 6 The hearing must be held and a written decision
rendered within forty-five days after receipt of a request for a hear-
ing; the advocate should be alert to preserve the timeliness of the
proceedings.5 7 The request for the hearing should be directed to the
local school board,58 and it should be sent by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested.5 9 Although the regulations are silent
as to any subpoena power, they do guarantee a right to "compel the
attendance of witnesses. '6  This right may be very critical in
connection with a school system employee who is prepared to give
testimony favorable to the child but who wants the protection of the
fact that his or her testimony is "under compulsion" and thus not
volunteered. You have the right to present evidence and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses which would appear to minimize the
ability of the hearing officer to consider hearsay evidence.2, The
regulations 'are silent regarding the applicability of formal rules of
evidence so it would be logical to assume that they are not control-
ling. There is also no guidance given regarding the order or burden
of proof but it may certainly be argued that the burden of proof
should remain with the schools and they would consequently pres-
ent their evidence first.22 There is a right to a written or electronic
256. See text at notes 189-190, supra.
257. See text at notes 192, 202, supra.
258. VA. SPEC. ED. REGS. 46.
259. See Request for Local Due Process Hearing in Appendix B, infra. The use of registered
or certified mail with a return receipt is for the purpose of insuring a complete record.
260. See text at note 189, supra.
261. Id.
262. See J. L. REF., supra note 7, at 145. Virginia's proposed manual for hearing officers
places the burden of proof "on the local school division to substantiate its action(s) or posi-
tion(s) regardless of which party, parent or local school division, initiates the appeal."
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A DUE PROCESS HEARING MANUAL FOR LOCAL SCHOOL
DIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 3 (Second Draft May, 1979). A recent federal court decision indicates
that the allocation of the burden of proof to the child and parents is not violative of due
process or of Section 504 in a proceeding that antedated Pub. L. No. 94-142. Stemple v. Board
of Educ. of Prince George's Co., 464 F. Supp. 258, 260-61 (D.Md. 1979).
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verbatim record of the hearing but the advocate should request that
a verbatim written transcript be made available in a timely manner
following the hearing.283 The parties also have the right to counsel
and to the presence and advice of experts in the problems of handi-
capped children. ' Rights also exist at the option of the parents to
have the child present and to open the hearing to the public. 6 '
Consideration should be given to the exercise of these two options
as the presence of representatives of parent and advocacy groups
could have an impact on a hearing officer as may the presence of a
"live" child as opposed to some third party not present. However,
this advantage in having the child present should be balanced by
the impact on the child of hearing a penetrating and frank discus-
sion of his condition.266
The value of the independent evaluation can be quite great at the
due process hearing, especially since the hearing officer, although
perhaps a lawyer, will most often be largely ignorant of the special-
ized educational considerations and your expert may play a signifi-
cant role in educating the hearing officer.2 17 For the same reason the
expert and any other independent evaluator should be present to
testify as the school's experts and witnesses will always be present.
You would not want to counter live testimony with stipulated letters
or other writings. The advocate should also be sure to use the expert
evaluator to educate himself or herself prior to the hearing so as to
be better prepared both for the presentation of the evaluator's evi-
dence and for the cross-examination of the school's experts.
The hearing officer, as mentioned above, will often be an attorney
but will usually not be an expert in the law governing the rights of
the handicapped or in the educational principles that apply to the
remediation of handicaps. The hearing officer must be impartial
and not connected with the local or state educational agencies.268
You should contact the hearing officer prior to the hearing to intro-
263. See text at note 191, supra.
264. See text at note 188, supra.
265. See text at notes 193-94, supra.
266. A strong presumption should exist in favor of the presence of the child since it is the
child's rights and educational future that are at stake.
267. The advocate should also utilize the expert to educate himself or herself prior to the
hearing, as well.
268. See text at note 187, supra.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
duce yourself and to discuss the procedures that will be followed in
instances not covered by the law or regulations. The decision of the
hearing officer must be in writing with both findings of fact and
decisions."' Pending any review the child must remain in his or her
present placement unless the parties mutually agree to a different
placement.2 7 0
K. Administrative Review and Appeal
If there is no local due process hearing procedure provided, or if
the parents are not satisfied with the conclusion reached at the local
process, an appeal can be taken to the state level with a request for
same directed to the State Board of Education, the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, or the state counterpart.2' The ap-
peal process must be completed within thirty days from the time the
request is filed to the time a written decision is transmitted to the
parties.2 2 There is a requirement that the hearing officer at the state
level again be impartial and independent, and the tactical consider-
ations in the preceding section apply equally here. 2 New evidence
may be presented at the state level to supplement the record estab-
lished at the local level, including an independent evaluation, in the
discretion of the State hearing officer. 74 The officer also has the
discretion to afford the parties an opportunity for oral or written
argument, or both, and you should generally request permission to
submit both since you will normally be the appealing party and you
should grasp every edge you can get.275 The hearing officer must
make an independent decision and transmit written findings of fact
and decisions to the parties.2 7
L. School Discipline
The advocate should carefully read the district court decision in
269. See text at note 192, supra.
270. Note 253, supra.
271. See text at note 206, supra.
272. See text at note 215, supra.
273. See text at notes 176-203, 206, supra.
274. See text at note 210, supra.
275. See text at note 212, supra.
276. See text at notes 207, 213-214, supra.
[Vol. 13:783
THE REPUDIATION OF PLATO
Stuart v. Nappi 17 when involved in the representation of a handi-
capped child who is the subject of any school disciplinary proceed-
ings. Stuart would dictate that the advocate immediately request a
review of the child's educational placement and thus initiate the
hearing process to preclude any expulsion or long-term suspen-
sion.25
M. Judicial Proceedings
Before initiating any litigation, counsel should be sure to exhaust
all available administrative remedies unless either the child is being
denied any appropriate education at all or the administrative proce-
dures provided are so inadequate as to render utilization futile. 211
The more difficult decision for counsel is choosing the forum for
judicial review of the administrative decisions since the Act and
regulations give a choice between a state or federal court.20 State
law may also give a choice between state forums and counsel should
explore these various options to determine the most favorable one
for his client.21
N. Administrative Complaints and Other Strategies
The advocate should also consider mobilizing parent groups and
making a joint or individual appearance before a local or State
school board or State Advisory Panel to deal with complaints that
are pervasive and widespread. Consideration should also be given
to filing an administrative complaint with the Bureau of Education
for the Handicapped 2 2 or with the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 2 3 with copies to the
277. Note 170, supra. See also the strong language in Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School
Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 636 (S.D.Tex. 1978).
278. Id. at 1241-3.
279. See Harris v. Campbell, supra note 219. See also text accompanying note 216, supra.
280. See text accompanying note 217, supra.
281. For example, although VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.4.D (Cum Supp. 1979) and VA. SPEc.
ED. REGS. 49 both provide for jurisdiction in a circuit court, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241.G.
and -278 (Cum. Supp. 1979) would seem to give a juvenile and domestic relations district
court jurisdiction over cases involving the failure of a school system to comply with state or
federal law.
282. See text at note 231, supra.
283. Id.
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Supervisor of
Special Education, the Assistant State Attorney General responsi-
ble for the Department of Education, the local Superintendent of
Schools, the local Supervisor of Special Education, the Chairman
of the local School Board and the local School Board attorney.
0. Advocacy Skills and Ethical Issues
As should be apparent by now, the representation of handicapped
children in securing a free appropriate public education is a highly
specialized process with which few persons are familiar. Conse-
quently, it is important for the advocate to engage in considerable
self-education both as to the law and the particular disability in-
volved in the client's case. There are also some difficult ethical
questions presented in the representation of a handicapped child
with the most difficult ones being the decision-making issue and the
problems involved in a possible conflict between the :parent's desires
and the child's best interests. The decision-making issue is pre-
sented by the temptation for the lawyer or other advocate to decide
what is best for the minor, or even adult, handicapped client. 84 The
advocate must be willing to consult with, and give credence to, the
client and the client's wishes. The parent-child conflict may be even
more difficult where the attorney or other advocate is contacted by
the parents to represent the handicapped child and it becomes ap-
parent that the parent's wishes diverge from the obvious best inter-
ests of the child. This will especially be true where parents desire
institutionalization for a child which does-not appear necessary and
is even violative of the principle of the least restrictive environ-
ment.9 In this situation the advocate should always remember that
the handicapped child is the client and the advocate should either
persist in advancing the child's interests or withdraw from the pro-
ceedings. 5
284. See authorities cited in note 241, supra.
285. This increasingly will be a problem as the pressure for deinstitutionalization of handi-
capped children accelerates. A problem may exist as to authority to represent a child without
parental consent. See Doe v. Grile, Civ. No. F 77-108, 3 EHLR 551:151 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 31,
1979).
286. See authorities cited in note 241, supra.
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P. Other Resources
There are an increasing number of resources available for the
representation of handicapped persons or as technical advisors to
persons serving as advocates. A list of these various resources is
included in Appendix A to this article, and the advocate should not
hesitate to consult with these groups to assist him or her in the case.
The advocate should also be prepared to contact the available par-
ent and professional groups for advice and support. 8 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The advancement of the rights of handicapped persons has be-
come the latest in a steady series of civil rights movements since
World War II and it has been a long time coming, as the Plato
quotation prefacing this article amply demonstrates. The mere pas-
sage of legislation and the promulgation of implementing regula-
tions will not alone cause rights long unrealized to magically burst
into fruition. It will take the cooperative dedication of educators,
parents and advocates to insure the realization of the expressed
congressional purpose.m There are many unanswered questions in
the Acts and their regulations that can only be addressed by the
efforts of advocates in hammering out precedents before hearing
officers and in the courts. In this, the International Year of the
Child, it is appropriate to address to the potential advocate the
challenge posed by the late Robert F. Kennedy in the preface to his
1967 book, To Seek A Newer World, where he quoted Albert Camus
thusly:
Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which
children are tortured. But we can reduce the number of tortured
children. And if you don't help us, who else in the world can help us
do this?2 19
287. See note 240, supra. These groups can frequently provide assistance to the clients and
supply valuable technical advice to the advocate.
288. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
289. R. KENNEDY, To SEEK A NEWER WORLD vii (1967).
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APPENDIX A
Selected Resources to Assist the Advocate for the Handicapped
Child.
I. National Advocacy and Service Organizations






1520 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 483-1470




Developmental Disabilities Law Center
University of Maryland Law School
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
(301) 528-6307
Mental Disability Legal Resource Center
American Bar Association
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 331-2240
Mental Health Law Project
1220 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 467-5730
National Center for Law and the Handicapped
211 West Washington Street, Suite 1900
South Bend, Indiana 46601
(219) 288-4751
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National Juvenile Law Center
St. Louis University School of Law
3701 Lindell Boulevard
St. Louis, Missouri 63108
(314) 533-8868





693 Mission Street - Second Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
(415) 543-3307
II. Virginia Advocacy Organizations
Virginia Developmental Disabilities Protection
and Advocacy Office
Ninth Street Office Building, Suite 100
Richmond, Virginia 23219
1-800-552-3962 (outside Richmond area)
(804) 786-4185 (Richmond area)
Youth Advocacy Clinic
University of Richmond Law School
University of Richmond, Virginia 23173
(804) 285-6370
III. National and Regional Governmental Agencies
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped
400 6th Street, S.W.
Donohoe Building
Washington, D.C. 20201
Director, Office for Civil Rights
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201
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HEW (Region II)O





IV. Virginia Governmental Agencies
James T. Micklem, Director







National Center for Law and the Handicapped
211 West Washington Street, Suite 1900
South Bend, Indiana 46601
Individual Subscription - $10.00 per year
Library and Organization Subscription - $12.00 per year
Education for the Handicapped Law Report
CRR Publishing Company
1156 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 724
Washington, D.C. 20005
General Subscription - $300.00 per year
Mental Disability Law Reporter
ABA Mental Disability Legal Resource Center
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
General Subscription - $35.00 per year
Public Defender, Legal Aid, Poverty
Law Offices and Non-legal Advocacy Programs -$25.00 per year
290. This is the region for Detaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia and West Virginia.
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APPENDIX B
Sample Correspondence 21






(City, State, Zip Code)
Re: (Name of Child) Date of birth: (Date)
Dear (Sir or Madam):
This is to advise you that I have been (retained) (requested) to
represent Mr. and Mrs. (name) in connection with their efforts to
obtain a free appropriate public education for (child's name). My
clients suspect that their (son) (daughter) is (describe suspected
handicapping condition) and desire an immediate evaluation lead-
ing to an individualized education program meeting for placement
in a program appropriate for their child's abilities. (Name of child)
was born on (month, day, year) and is presently (describe present
educational placement).
Would you please schedule (child's name) for an evaluation as
soon as possible pursuant to Public Law 94-142 and the implement-
ing federal and state regulations. Please advise me when and where
Mr. and Mrs. (name) should bring their child for (his) (her) evalua-
tion.
Thank you very much. With best wishes, I am,
Very truly yours,
(Your name)
291. These draft letters are based in part on sample letters contained in DEVELOPMENTAL
DisABnrmEs PLA 'mING COUNCIL OF VmI A, A LEGAL RIGs HANDBOOK FOR THE DEVELOPMEN-
TALLY DisABLED CrIZENS OF VIRGINIA 9-11 (2d Ed. 1978). They should be tailored to fit the
specific needs in a given case.
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CC: James T. Micklem, Director











(City, State, Zip Code)
Re: (Name of Child) Date of Birth: (Date)
Dear (Sir or Madam):
This is to advise you that I have been (retained) (requested) to
represent Mr. and Mrs. (name) in connection with their efforts to
obtain a free appropriate public education for (child's name). In
connection with that representation I wish to secure copies of all the
school records, tests and reports on this child and (will be at your
office on (date) at (time) to examine and secure copies of these
records) (would like copies of these records sent to me at my office
along with any bill for copying as soon as possible).
These records are sought pursuant to the provisions of Public Law
94-142 and the "Buckley Amendment" and their implementing reg-
ulations. Mr. and Mrs. (name) have joined in this letter to authorize
release of the records to me. With best wishes, I am,
[Vol. 13:783
THE REPUDIATION OF PLATO
Very truly yours,
(Your name)
We, the parents of (child's name) hereby authorize the release of







CC: James T. Micklem, Director











(City, State, Zip Code)
Re: (Name of Child) Date of Birth: (Date)
Dear (Sir of Madam):
This is to advise you that I have been (retained) (requested) to
represent Mr. and Mrs. (name) in connection with their efforts to
obtain a free appropriate public education for (child's name). Mr.
and Mrs. (name) do not agree with the (evaluation) (placement
recommended pursuant to the IEP meeting) of (child's name) and
wish to request a hearing on this matter pursuant to Public Law 94-
142 and its implementing State and federal Regulations. We would
like for this hearing to be scheduled as soon as possible. Please
advise me of the name, address and telephone number of the hear-
19791
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing officer as soon as his or her identity is ascertained. I would also
request that a verbatim written transcript be prepared of the hear-
ing when held.
Please notify Mr. and Mrs. (name) and me of the time, date and
place for the hearing when it is scheduled and it might be (desira-
ble) to check with me regarding the proposed date prior to sending
out any notices so as to avoid a conflict that would require resched-
uling the hearing. Mr. and Mrs. (name) have joined in this letter to




We, the parents of (child's name) join in and affirm this request






CC: James T. Micklem, Director





IV. Request for State Review.
(Your address)
(Date)
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Department of Education
Post Office Box 6Q
Richmond, Virginia 23216
Re: (Name of Child) Date of Birth: (Date)
(Locality)
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Dear (Sir or Madam):
This is to advise you that I have been (retained) (requested) to
represent Mr. and Mrs. (name) in connection with their efforts to
obtain a free appropriate public education for (child's name) in the
(local school division) schools. Mr. and Mrs. (name) do not agree
with the decision reached on (date) by (name of local hearing offi-
cer), the hearing officer for the (local school division) and desire a
review of (his) (her) decision pursuant to Public Law 94-142 and its
implementing State and federal Regulations. We would like for this
review hearing to be scheduled as soon as possible as we request the
opportunity to present both written and oral arguments to the hear-
ing officer. Please advise me of the name, address and telephone
number of the hearing officer assigned as soon as his or her identity
is ascertained.
Please notify Mr. and Mrs. (name) and me of the time, date and
place for the hearing when it is scheduled and it might be desirable
to check with me regarding the proposed date prior to sending out
any notices so as to avoid a conflict that would require rescheduling
the hearing. Mr. and Mrs. (name) have joined in this letter to con-
firm their request for a review hearing. Thank you very much. With
best wishes, I am,
Very truly yours,
(Your name)
We, the parents of (child's name) join in and affirm this request
for a review of the local hearing officer's decision of (date) in (local






CC: James T. Micklem, Director
Division of Special Education and
Support Services
Department of Education
P.O. Box 6Q
Richmond, Virginia 23216
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